MENA vs Democracy

Bellin argues that MENA states resist democratic reform for four main reasons. First, civil society is weak in MENA and therefore is in effective at advocating for democracy. Secondly, the majority of the economy falls in the hands of the state. Attempts to structurally adjust the economy have failed because a large portion of the GNP and employment come from the public sector. The third reason MENA states are unable to become democratic is because of poverty in MENA states. People are very poor, literacy rates are extremely low, and inequality is universal. Fourth, the region is geographically very far from the epicenter of democratization. And she argues when all else fails there is always the explanation of culture and religion playing a big role on the MENA regions efforts to be democratic.

I think that after the Arab Revolts in 2011, Bellin’s arguments still hold true. Although the Arab Revolts added to the conversation in democratization it didn’t change the conversation. Meaning that many MENA states are still not considered free and democratic. Those states that were able to create a democracy, struggle to maintain it because of corruption and instability. This would suggest that Bellin’s arguments are still relevant. I think her argument has an exception to the rule is in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the center of two revolutions. I think their revolutions can be credited to the strong presence of civil societies. It is because of the heavy presence of civil society groups that ideas were able to spread quickly and effectively. Bellin argues that the reason democracy can’t survive in MENA is because of small amount of civil society activists. But I think the two instances where citizens specifically revolted against their government can be credited to a strong civil society presence. It’s hard to categorize a entire region based on one overarching argument but her ideas seem to still hold true because MENA is the least democratic region in the world.

Lack of Democratization in MENA

Bellin writes in her piece, "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders" that, most states in the MENA region have not democratized or even begun transitioning towards democracy yet, because of present conditions within the states.  She argues that it is not because of the prerequisite, non-democratic elements in these countries, but rather the fact that they have strong government heads who are against democracy and robust coercive apparatuses.  Bellin is right to an extent.  However, I believe the MENA region has not been able to make progress in this area for both prerequisite and present issues within the countries.  

The anti-democratic prerequisites mentioned in Bellin’s piece were a weak civil society, an economy that is largely in the state's hands, people who are poor, illiterate and inequality that is significant, countries geographically isolated from democratic examples, and the existence of cultures that are inhospitable to democracy.  While she mentions that these should still be considered in determining what keeps MENA states from democratizing, I think a couple should be considered major constraints. 

The present conditions would not be reasons the MENA states have not democratized without some of the prerequisites.  For example, presently the people who hold political power within these states have an immense amount of power over the people and therefore are able to maintain a monopoly on means of coercion and rebellion.  This would not be true without the fact that the people they govern, are highly illiterate and poor.  It is much easier for the government to persuade and manipulate these populations because they do not have the educations or resources to effectively revolt against their oppressors. 

In light of the Arab Revolts of 2011, I think Bellin’s argument is slightly inaccurate.  She argues that state power and the robustness of coercive apparatuses within the governments make revolution and change nearly impossible when in 2011 the people actually came fairly close to all out rebellion.  These people were able to speak out however, they could not fulfill their goals maybe because they did not plan enough.  Leaders were forced to step down in several countries however, these most of these states are still not free from oppression today.  Bellin writes about how coup d’etats are not always effective because once the position is left open it is up for grabs by anyone and everyone who wants it which can sometimes result in an even more oppressive regime.  In this way Bellin’s argument is relevant to the Arab Spring however, when she says that states will squash any initiatives favorable to democracy, she is wrong.  The states were not strong enough to squash these revolts as they did go on for months and some even achieved their goals of overthrowing oppressive leaders.  The revolutionaries were simply unsuccessful in maintaining the power and influence they had earned afterwards.

Bellin would probably describe the events in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 as being due to state inefficiencies, not the power of civil society.  When Tunisian and Egyptian rebels united technologically via social media and strategized about how to take down their oppressive leaders, the state governments did not do anything to stop them.  Bellin would argue that in Egypt especially, Mubarak lacked the strength and the robust coercive apparatus necessary to squash the democratic initiatives.     

In conclusion, I do not think it is accurate to say that the civil society in the MENA region is “weak and…an ineffective champion of democracy.”  There have been some successful campaigns for democracy in this region so therefore they are not weak in regards to this.  These states have also gained from time to time democratic elements in some areas such as Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia.  They are not ineffective champions of democracy indefinitely although they have struggled with it the most in the world I would say.        

MENA's Resistance to Democracy

The MENA region has been resistant to democratic reform for several reasons. Bellin notes that there are several traditional reasons as to why the MENA region has lagged behind in forming democracies: "the lack of a strong civil society, a market-driven economy, adequate income and literacy levels, democratic neighbors, and democratic culture", but these reasons are invalid because there are numerous other regions in the world that lack these features and still have functioning democracies (23). Bellin instead argues that a coercive apparatus is funded in large part from abundant rent. Furthermore, the West continues to support several non-democratic regimes in the region in the interest of security. Even though other regions in the world have an ineffective popular voice and patrimonialism, nonetheless, these factors also explain why the MENA region has been resistant to democratic reform. 

I think that after the Arab Revolts of 2011, Bellin's argument is still a relevant and strong one. I feel like even though there were several attempts to democratize, they were only slightly successful. The MENA region is still relatively a democratically barren one. The democracies that did emerge are generally still weak. Bellin's argument still appears to mostly hold true, but it might not be quite as accurate to say that civil society is weak. It might be more accurate to say that civil society is strong, because each nation has a strong and expressive culture. However, it is still difficult for civil society to rise up and form a voice, especially in non-democracies with limited freedom of speech. In societies such as those, the only way to dramatically change into a democracy and express voice is to have a revolution instead of an election. This is what was seen in Tunisia and Egypt. Bellin would likely say that the reason that these nations had revolutions was because their civil society had a strong voice and mobilized despite an environment not conducive to legal revolution. Overall, I think that a single argument for an entire region is never going to be 100% accurate. However, Bellin's argument still appears to be relevant today because even though the revolts in the region did occur, the region still appears to be one of the least conducive to democracies in the world. 

Are MENA States Weak?

       While there are several different aspects that are a part of defining the "strength" of a state, one of the most comprehensive ways to define the strength of a state is to assess the ability of that state to provide public goods and services for its people (such as infrastructure, security, and law enforcement). Another component of a state's strength is its ability to maintain its own internal sovereignty by having authority over the state that it controls. A state that is strong will have definite, undisputed control over its territory, while a weak state is one that is divided between multiple parties with authority being either absent or divided. This includes states that are divided by civil conflicts and those that have lost their sovereignty because of foreign interference, whether it be a more positive form of interference like military support or a negative form like a military occupation.
      There is an important clarification to be made about assessing the strength of states: being a strong state does not necessarily mean that a state is more developed or that weak states are "backwards" or unsophisticated. Developed states can be weak just as developing states can be strong. The strength of a state is not a reflection of the culture of its people or their values, it is a reflection of the power of that government and its ability to maintain authority in the state–no matter how they hold that authority–and provide for its people.
      It is difficult to characterize the typical MENA state as it is a region that is composed of diverse systems of government in a variety of circumstances. However, states in MENA are relatively weak compared to other states. It is a region in which many of the states are plagued with instability, conflict, and divisiveness which have made it difficult to maintain sovereignty and provide services to the citizens of these states and has made MENA states particularly susceptible to weakening. MENA is a region in which power is frequently contested and states are often not able to hold unique authority over their people. Syria and Iraq are in a state of complete disarray because of civil conflicts that have resulted in different groups laying claim to their territories. For example, the Islamic State has claimed parts of Syria and Iraq, effectively making the state unable to hold authority in those territories, which weakens these states. Yemen is in a civil war with the Houthi rebels, who at one point had captured the capital Sana'a and almost completely wiped out the Yemeni state. The state of Libya is divided between two governments, and Sudan lost a good amount of their territory in the creation of South Sudan. Sovereignty is not something that these states have been able to maintain. These are just some examples of weak states in MENA, but, in general, MENA states have had trouble with controlling their populations and upholding their authority because their generally more authoritarian regimes have provoked uprisings from the people and created divisions in these states.
       
       

Weekly Question: "Authoritarian Persistence"

Why has the MENA region been so resistant to democratic reform? In light of the Arab Revolts of 2011, what do you think of Bellin’s argument? Is it still relevant? Why/why not? Also, how would she explain what happened in Tunisia and Egypt? Is it accurate to say, as some do, that the region’s civil society is “weak and… an ineffective champion of democracy” (Bellin 2005: 22)?

Strong vs. Weak States

What would you say is the correct characterization of the typical MENA state?

The correct characterization is neither of the given definitions. A MENA state is not strong because they are heavily securitized and are capable of utilizing force to repress dissent. Many of these authoritarian regimes have large military or security forces that are often relatively unregulated and unchecked. Owen considers it an essential job of an authoritarian government to destroy groups that it cannot control through such forces. But this does not lead to strength since the strength of a state is determined by its international status and leverage. If a state is not stable and is run by fear, it will struggle to negotiate and trade internationally. Furthermore, such regimes do not create domestic stability. Instead, those actions spark dissent.

The definition by Anderson characterizes MENA states better. According to Anderson, states can be characterized as either strong or weak. Strong states have modern administrative structures that are well-established and stable. Weak states have administrations that are either incapable of consistently reaching the major part of the population in order to extract resources and provide services or are characterized by patrimonial patterns of recruitment and operations.

MENA states have historically been politically tumultuous, and this trend continues to this day. The administrative powers are not well-established, they are constantly shifting and changing. They are also not widely supported by their constituencies.  Anderson argues that there is a separation of politics and administration, resulting in low population participation. Owen highlights the fact that in MENA states, there is often a lack of powerful institutions, as while as a shrinkage of the legal system which also leads to lower participation. This lack of support is founded in people's loyalty to non-state ideologies above nationalism such as ethnicity, ideology, and religion rooted in post World War II state boundaries that were not congruent with indigenous social formations or economic systems. This split and potential disloyalty creates cracks in public opinion and support weakening state power and legitimacy.

Furthermore, most MENA states have a large amount of power with their president or leader. Administration and military positions, according to Anderson, are often distributed by patronage and personal ties. This leads to further disconnect and conflict within the state, weakening its foundation. It also fits into the second definition of a weak state.

In the study of MENA political dynamics (or political dynamics anywhere for that matter) what are the implications of differing conceptualizations of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states?

Every state is unique, which leads to a great challenge when trying to label states' relative strength. I think it all depends on what area you are focusing on. For example, some states are "strong" in the sense that they are able to provide health care or education to most of its population. But that same state can be considered "weak" due to its government structure that is filled with corruption. Other states, such as Saudi Arabia, can be considered strong internationally because they have natural resources that they can use for leverage. But domestically, they can be very weak in other areas, especially if the natural resources are privately controlled instead of state controlled. Therefore, each philosophy can be used for a certain, limited purpose, but no definition should be considered over-arching. Ignoring that fact can lead to confusion, cultural misconceptions, and mislabeling of a state.

Strong vs Weak

          The World Bank described a weak state as, “low income countries under stress”. I would consider MENA states as weak because many are poor and have weak structures of government to support their wealth. For example, countries like Syria where 11% of their population lives in extreme poverty. Syria is also under extreme stress due to the war which has caused their structure of government to essentially fall apart. They are unable to keep ISIS out and instead have allowed terrorists to infect their country because they can’t defend it themselves. This deems Syria as a weak state. In addition, Libya also has an extreme weak economy due to mismanagement of their government and natural resources. Many, not all, MENA states have similar issues that plague their country. They are considered weak because of their lack of money and how many of them also are dealing with war and corruption which has crippled their states even more.

            It is hard to exactly define what makes a strong state and what makes a weak state because those implications mean different things to every state. No state is alike. For example, a large military could really make a state strong. On the other hand though, a large military could hurt a small state by creating a large unemployment rate in the private sector because all the men are in the military. It’s hard to categorize a strong state by saying a  state with nuclear power, a military, high GDP, fair government, and a healthy population because those things don’t always make a state strong. The “bandwagoning act” is an interesting perspective on the idea of weak and strong states. States with less money and resources link up and form alliances with states that have more money and resources in order to protect their interests. If a weaker state links up with a stronger state, does that make the weaker state strong? It is because of these complications it is hardly impossible to come up with a single-handed definition of what makes a state weak or strong.