Here Be Dragons...

This article about Hollywood's depiction of the world outside isn't quite on topic for our course, but it does speak to the issues of othering and fearing the dangerous world outside the US borders that we've been talking about, especially when it comes to the Muslim world. It also demonstrates that being a liberal or 'leftist' doesn't immunize you from these tendencies of exotizing and fearing the world outside.

Enjoy Oscar night!

Social Movements and the MENA State

You have two readings for this week - one on the potential of social movements as an avenue of democratic representation and one on the state in the MENA region. I want you to try to make a link between the two - how might social movements work/not work in the different types of states you find across the region? In other words, what opportunities and/or challenges do you see to social movements  functioning as an avenue of democratic participation in the region? And, in light of our conversation with Dr. Gene Sharp, how do you think these opportunities/challenges differ between revolutionary and non-revolutionary movements?

 

Guest Appearance by Dr. Gene Sharp

The Civil Societies of the MENA Region

In your reading this week, you're introduced to different conceptualizations of civil society in the MENA region. You have read about al-mujtama' al-ahli ('traditional' civil society), al-mujtama' al-madani ('civic' civil society), and al-mujtama' al-hajin ('hybrid' civil society). I want you to reflect further on the issue I raise in my previous post, namely that of authenticity and legitimacy. What does it mean for civil society actors to be able to claim legitimacy as 'organic' parts of broader society? How could this issue throw a wrench in the mainstream model of civil society's role in democratization (i.e. a vibrant civil society is an important prerequisite to democratization and functions as a 'counterweight' to the influence of the state)?

Understanding Civil Society as a Contentious Realm

The concept of "civil society" Roger Owen points out, is "too slippery and too ambiguous to be of any help as a tool for the analysis of the political process" (Owen 2004, 201). Studies trying to evaluate the role of civil society in democratization, for instance, have to spend considerable time delineating the boundaries of their particular conceptualization of civil society and justify the inclusion and exclusion of actors, based on specific criteria that they establish. Often, this involves an evaluation of whether or not an actor engages in "non-political" activities. While this may be a straightforward task when it comes to the simple distinction between actors seeking to gain political power in a country (such as political parties) and actors with no interest in a role in government (such as NGOs), when it comes to activities such as advocacy, monitoring, and lobbying efforts towards political reform, we have to take a significant leap of faith to classify them as "non-political."

So why can't I just let you operate with a simple definition of civil society as "a sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the state, political, and economic spheres" (Spurk 2010, 8)? Well, the answer is in the rest of Spurk's definition: "...keeping in mind that in practice the boundaries between these sectors are often complex and blurred. It consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary organizations - competing with each other and oriented to specific interests - that are not purely driven by private or economic interests, are autonomously organized, and interact in the public sphere" (Spurk 2010, 8-9). No longer a simple definition, is it? It is easy to conceive of civil society, broadly speaking, but it is much more difficult to turn it into a useful analytical tool, something that can help us make sense of the reality we see on the ground.

The focus on a distinction between "political" and "non-political" groups diverts our attention from how reform actually happens and what obstacles there may be for CSOs in democratization processes in three ways. First, it is based on the erroneous assumption that authoritarian governments will agree that advocacy, monitoring, and lobbying for political reform are "non-political" activities. Groups working towards a fundamental overhaul of the political system will inevitably arouse the anger of those who benefit from that political system (not necessarily only those in the government - I will return to that point below). In other words, these activities can be expected to stir up contention, which can take its form in state suppression of supposedly non-political civil society organizations, but also objections from other "non-political" actors. The notion that civil society can somehow stay "clean" from the taint of the political sphere is therefore false. When we decide who to include and exclude from our analysis of democratization processes, this false notion steers us in the direction of excluding actors who are very much involved in these processes, simply because they do not fit our criteria of "non-political" CSOs, while including other actors we deem "non-political," but who from the perspective of the state is every bit as much political as those we have excluded. However, state actors are not necessarily the only ones benefiting from the status quo - we need to take the diversity of non-state actors seriously and recognize that there may be opposition from within the realm we have identified as civil society (i.e. "non-political" actors) to any given reform project.

Second, implicit in this model of civil society's role in democratization is an assumption that non-state actors - whatever their area of operation - are progressive forces that will in the long run broaden the space for political participation (with the exception of violent non-state actors, which are excluded by most definitions of civil society). However, empirical evidence does not support the notion that working on service provision or poverty alleviation will necessarily contribute towards democratization (see, for instance, Allen 1997). The way reform actually happens, if we consider the empirical evidence, is through contentious processes, where actors of different character temporarily form alliances and launch strategic efforts on particular issues.

Third, by concerning ourselves primarily with the character of an organization or group as "non-political" or "political," we miss out on more significant differences in character. In the MENA region, it is true that reformist elements face challenges from authoritarian states, but that is not the only source of obstacles for reform projects. Many CSOs working in the realm of advocacy, monitoring, and lobbying for political reform, are of a "secular-liberal" type, that is, they are they type of NGOs you expect to find in the Western conceptualization of civil society. But there is a long history in the region of volunteerism and non-state associations - a "traditional" civil society if you will. This "traditional" civil society is home to, for instance, faith based organizations (FBOs), community based organization (CBOs), family associations, and various patron foundations. In other words, it is possible to distinguish between a "traditional" and a "civic" civil society in the region. The purpose of making such a distinction is not to suggest that actors in these two realms are always at odds - they are not - but it is important to recognize that they operate under very different conditions, particularly when it comes to their level of legitimacy as an "organic" part of broader society. This is the case because actors in civic society lack a clear constituency to tap for resources (as opposed to FBOs and CBOs) and are heavily dependent on foreign funding. As a result, they have been vulnerable to accusations from their opponents of being "foreign agents," which is an ironic accusation when it comes from authoritarian governments in the region, many of whom have been heavily dependent on foreign patronage.  

In conclusion, when it comes to civil society's role in democratization, what we see in reality is not a clear division of "political" groups that work against democratization, and "non-political" groups that work for democratization. What we see is a contentious and messy process of alliance building between groups actively working towards gaining political power (such as political elites and parties) and groups working on the framework for politics (such as NGOs). Sometimes groups in the "non-political" category is not at all a progressive force for broadening the space for political participation, while political actors are. Other times, the roles are reversed. Most of the time, however, the various projects and campaigns that can be seen as steps towards democratization include actors from across the spectrum of actors. So how do we study civil society's role in democratization?

We need to conceptualize civil society as a realm of contention, where strategies are devised, alliances are built, and activity is inherently political. This shifts our focus from the concern of whether or not a particular type of CSO is allowed to operate free of state repression, to the various struggles to broaden the space for political participation that take place within the realm of civil society. This is where social movement theory comes to our aid - you'll find out how in the coming couple of weeks. 

The Shahbag Movement in Bangladesh

Right now, millions of people are mobilizing in Bangladesh in what we might tentatively call the "Shahbag Movement," since the epicenter of protests is in the Shahbag district of Dhaka. We don't hear much about it in the global media, because apparently a week of sustained non-violent popular mobilization for justice isn't quite as interesting as the kind of stories that fit the narrative of rampant Muslim extremism across the Islamic world. To be fair, CNN did cover the initial stage of protests, but since it has developed into a massive non-violent movement nationwide, as opposed to chaotic street violence, they seem to have lost interest.

So what is going on and why is it of interest to us in this class? I want to make two key points in this post: First, the Shahbag Movement in Bangladesh is an example of a broad-based, non-violent mobilization of ordinary people who are trying to change their political reality. It represents a rejection of impunity and religious extremism. Second, despite its massive scope and, thus far, sustained character (protests have been going on for about a week), we hear basically nothing about it in our regular media outlets. It is a perfect example of how selective our media coverage is and should serve as a reminder to us all that we have to work hard to stay informed about the world.

The protests began when the first verdicts in the ongoing war crimes trials were announced. The trials, initiated in 2010, address crimes committed during the 1971 Liberation War against Pakistan, in which Bangladesh gained independence. At the center of the trials is the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which opposed Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan and collaborated with Pakistani forces during the liberation struggle. These were days when intellectuals were rounded up and murdered, women were systematically raped in the hundreds of thousands, and entire villages were erased from existence. The spark for the current protests was the verdict against prominent JI leader Abdul Quader Mollah, who was accused of killing 344 civilians. To the dismay of the families of the victims of 1971, who have been waiting for justice for more than 40 years, he was sentenced to life imprisonment - not the death penalty. But the protests are not simply pushing for the hanging of Mollah - it is not a movement driven by vengeance - it is representative of a broader sense of selective justice and a reaction against the Islamist agenda of JI. It should be noted that JI won less than five seats out of 300 in the latest parliamentary elections in 2008. Their power is derived from their potential role as 'kingmakers,' not from being a strong force in society. 

Bangladesh was born out of a secular struggle. It was very much a cultural and intellectual movement, a reaction against the notion that because they were Muslim, the people of Bangladesh (then "East Pakistan") should be tied to and controlled by (then 'West') Pakistan. At the center of the cultural struggle was the language, Bangla (Bangladesh means "land of Bangla"), and while a predominantly Muslim nation, the national identity has been built around culture, not religion. What we see in the streets of Dhaka right now, and spreading across the country, is a revival of the spirit of 1971 - it is at once a rejection of the islamist agenda of JI and their likes, an expression of a popular demand for justice for those who were massacred, and a rejection of a culture of impunity that often prevails in post-conflict environments.

Whether the Shahbag Movement will leave a lasting legacy will depend on its ability to avoid political co-option from the dominant political parties (note: a movement being co-opted is different from a movement cultivating elite allies and capitalizing on those alliances), and its ability to articulate specific demands beyond the hanging of Mollah. This is not a revolutionary movement in the strict sense; the people in the streets are not seeking the fall of the government. As such, it is likely to face significant challenges in drafting a concrete 'mission statement,' but early signs would suggest that, at the very least, the movement has already succeeded in reviving the spirit of 1971, which could serve as an important watershed moment for the direction of politics in the country.

Bangladesh, a country of 150-170 million people, about 90 percent of which are Muslims, should be at the front of your mind the next time you hear alarmist reports about 'Muslim extremism' on the rise across the Islamic world. What we are fed on a daily basis from places like Bangladesh, but also from the region at the center of our course, MENA, paints a picture very different from reality. We will discuss further the reasons for the success of Islamists in post-revolution elections in Tunisia and Egypt, but I can mention briefly here that the reasons we will find have very little to do with a religious 'mood' among the public, and much more to do with organizational capabilities and credibility following decades of secular authoritarianism.

The way our news media operates today, if we want to be informed about the world around us, we have to make an effort to go beyond the hegemonic media discourse and actively seek out information. If we rely on what is delivered to us by the major networks, we won't notice those who struggle for political and social justice, unless people are dying in the streets. And even then it depends on whether the 'story' fits whatever criteria news organizations use to determine what is 'newsworthy.' A non-revolutionary social movement, no matter how significant and historic, will for the most part pass by without notice - even when they manage to mobilize millions in the streets. 

Civil Society

In your readings for Wednesday, you're reintroduced to the concept of 'civil society' and a case study of Palestinian civil society. What is civil society? What role can it play, if any, in broadening the space for political participation? What does the Palestinian case tell you about the challenges that MENA civil societies face?

Civil Society and Democratization

Why has the MENA region been so resistant to democratic reform? In light of the Arab Revolts of 2011, what do you think of Bellin's argument? How would she explain what happened in Tunisia and Egypt?

Also, is it accurate to say, as some do, that the region's civil society is "weak and... an ineffective champion of democracy" (Bellin 2005: 22)?