Understanding Civil Society as a Contentious Realm

The concept of "civil society" Roger Owen points out, is "too slippery and too ambiguous to be of any help as a tool for the analysis of the political process" (Owen 2004, 201). Studies trying to evaluate the role of civil society in democratization, for instance, have to spend considerable time delineating the boundaries of their particular conceptualization of civil society and justify the inclusion and exclusion of actors, based on specific criteria that they establish. Often, this involves an evaluation of whether or not an actor engages in "non-political" activities. While this may be a straightforward task when it comes to the simple distinction between actors seeking to gain political power in a country (such as political parties) and actors with no interest in a role in government (such as NGOs), when it comes to activities such as advocacy, monitoring, and lobbying efforts towards political reform, we have to take a significant leap of faith to classify them as "non-political."

So why can't I just let you operate with a simple definition of civil society as "a sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the state, political, and economic spheres" (Spurk 2010, 8)? Well, the answer is in the rest of Spurk's definition: "...keeping in mind that in practice the boundaries between these sectors are often complex and blurred. It consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary organizations - competing with each other and oriented to specific interests - that are not purely driven by private or economic interests, are autonomously organized, and interact in the public sphere" (Spurk 2010, 8-9). No longer a simple definition, is it? It is easy to conceive of civil society, broadly speaking, but it is much more difficult to turn it into a useful analytical tool, something that can help us make sense of the reality we see on the ground.

The focus on a distinction between "political" and "non-political" groups diverts our attention from how reform actually happens and what obstacles there may be for CSOs in democratization processes in three ways. First, it is based on the erroneous assumption that authoritarian governments will agree that advocacy, monitoring, and lobbying for political reform are "non-political" activities. Groups working towards a fundamental overhaul of the political system will inevitably arouse the anger of those who benefit from that political system (not necessarily only those in the government - I will return to that point below). In other words, these activities can be expected to stir up contention, which can take its form in state suppression of supposedly non-political civil society organizations, but also objections from other "non-political" actors. The notion that civil society can somehow stay "clean" from the taint of the political sphere is therefore false. When we decide who to include and exclude from our analysis of democratization processes, this false notion steers us in the direction of excluding actors who are very much involved in these processes, simply because they do not fit our criteria of "non-political" CSOs, while including other actors we deem "non-political," but who from the perspective of the state is every bit as much political as those we have excluded. However, state actors are not necessarily the only ones benefiting from the status quo - we need to take the diversity of non-state actors seriously and recognize that there may be opposition from within the realm we have identified as civil society (i.e. "non-political" actors) to any given reform project.

Second, implicit in this model of civil society's role in democratization is an assumption that non-state actors - whatever their area of operation - are progressive forces that will in the long run broaden the space for political participation (with the exception of violent non-state actors, which are excluded by most definitions of civil society). However, empirical evidence does not support the notion that working on service provision or poverty alleviation will necessarily contribute towards democratization (see, for instance, Allen 1997). The way reform actually happens, if we consider the empirical evidence, is through contentious processes, where actors of different character temporarily form alliances and launch strategic efforts on particular issues.

Third, by concerning ourselves primarily with the character of an organization or group as "non-political" or "political," we miss out on more significant differences in character. In the MENA region, it is true that reformist elements face challenges from authoritarian states, but that is not the only source of obstacles for reform projects. Many CSOs working in the realm of advocacy, monitoring, and lobbying for political reform, are of a "secular-liberal" type, that is, they are they type of NGOs you expect to find in the Western conceptualization of civil society. But there is a long history in the region of volunteerism and non-state associations - a "traditional" civil society if you will. This "traditional" civil society is home to, for instance, faith based organizations (FBOs), community based organization (CBOs), family associations, and various patron foundations. In other words, it is possible to distinguish between a "traditional" and a "civic" civil society in the region. The purpose of making such a distinction is not to suggest that actors in these two realms are always at odds - they are not - but it is important to recognize that they operate under very different conditions, particularly when it comes to their level of legitimacy as an "organic" part of broader society. This is the case because actors in civic society lack a clear constituency to tap for resources (as opposed to FBOs and CBOs) and are heavily dependent on foreign funding. As a result, they have been vulnerable to accusations from their opponents of being "foreign agents," which is an ironic accusation when it comes from authoritarian governments in the region, many of whom have been heavily dependent on foreign patronage.  

In conclusion, when it comes to civil society's role in democratization, what we see in reality is not a clear division of "political" groups that work against democratization, and "non-political" groups that work for democratization. What we see is a contentious and messy process of alliance building between groups actively working towards gaining political power (such as political elites and parties) and groups working on the framework for politics (such as NGOs). Sometimes groups in the "non-political" category is not at all a progressive force for broadening the space for political participation, while political actors are. Other times, the roles are reversed. Most of the time, however, the various projects and campaigns that can be seen as steps towards democratization include actors from across the spectrum of actors. So how do we study civil society's role in democratization?

We need to conceptualize civil society as a realm of contention, where strategies are devised, alliances are built, and activity is inherently political. This shifts our focus from the concern of whether or not a particular type of CSO is allowed to operate free of state repression, to the various struggles to broaden the space for political participation that take place within the realm of civil society. This is where social movement theory comes to our aid - you'll find out how in the coming couple of weeks.