Strong Versus Weak States Response

    The notion that a state is 'strong' because it is heavily securitized and/or able to effectively use force to repress dissent is wrong within the context of MENA. We know this to be true for if this lens was used then the majority of the regimes that have disintegrated since 2011 would have been classified as 'strong' and would still be standing. The state apparatuses of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Qaddafi all had extensive security services and had hitherto been able to crush dissent. However, they were evidently not 'strong' enough to withstand the turmoil which swept the region. This being said, a highly developed security apparatus and the ability to use force to crush dissent do in most cases make a state apparatus stronger but are not what make the state 'strong' to begin with.

    In order to characterize the "typical MENA state" as 'strong' or 'weak' it is important to develop a consistent definition for both. According to the reading by Lisa Anderson entitled The State in the Middle East and North Africa there is a clear disparity between the two. A 'strong' state is characterized by a modern administrative structure that is well-established and stable. According to Anderson a 'weak' state is characterized by a structure that is incapable of consistently reaching the major part of its population to extract resources or provide services and is usually characterized by a patrimonial pattern of recruitment and operations. Thus the strength of a state should be calculated by the sophistication and effectiveness of its structure and apparatus - in short, how well it can function. 

    Using the assumptions and definitions provided above the typical MENA state can be said to be one that is 'weak' or weakening, I say this for it is hard to find an example of a state in the region that doesn't struggle with reaching a large part of its population in terms of making them a part of 'the state'. This could be the Shi'a of the Arabian peninsula, the Berbers of the Maghreb or the Sunni Arabs of Iraq and Syria. A counterargument to this notion is plausible but the second part of Anderson's 'weak' state is not. Every single regime in the Middle East relies on patrimonial patterns of recruitment and operations to a wildly dangerous extent. One can argue to what degree culture and context influence this but the fact is that this inherently weakens the structure of the state and prevents it from growing and evolving. Thus the typical MENA state is inherently weak as not a single state - especially the royal families of the Gulf - has broken the traditional patrimonial pattern of state-building that inherently inhibits the growth and development of the state, weakening its ability to quickly and effectively respond to change. 

    

    Different conceptualizations of 'strong' and 'weak' states cause problems for several reasons. For one, from an academic standpoint it makes it almost impossible to effectively discuss the structure of states if they cannot be uniformly defined in their nature. Secondly, and most importantly I believe, if a state is perceived as 'weak' by one actor and 'strong' by another this could lead to dramatic and violent conclusions. It is obvious that political actors still need to work on their definitions as no one in the West thought the regimes that collapsed in the wake of 2011 to be 'weak' - in contrast they were perceived by most to be 'strong' enough to outlast the turmoil. Thus, different perceptions of strength and weakness can lead to different actions and responses both by local and international actors.