Non-Violent Movements in MENA

The notion of social movements has really taken off within the last century and the development of the non-violent social movement is a product of this evolutionary process. These movements can give power to marginalized groups within society, and sometimes this marginalization can actually occur towards the majority population. This was, and still is, the case with many MENA societies. Stephen Zunes writes that non-violent movements have historically developed in the region due to colonial oppression and, in more modern times, authoritarian repression. While social movements have often times occurred between the people of a nation/group/tribe and the elite government authority, they have also developed as a result of regional conflict between two states, as is the case with the intifada movement of Palestine.

The intifada movement was the result of Israeli occupation within certain Palestinian territories that Israel gained during the June War of 1967. The intifada didn't develop directly after this occupation, however, but instead was based on the workings of many different grassroot organizations that were created in the 1970's to help Palestinian communities with education, agriculture, and healthcare. This made the intifada truly based on the decisions and work of the common people. During the 1980's during the movement's peak, civil disobedience was the most used method for going about their process. In many ways this worked because people were finally seeing non-violent action coming from an area strife with conflict. However, a drawback of the intifada was that many people within the movement simply waited for the Israelis to do something so that they could immediately respond, instead of going about initiating action themselves.

Despite this, the movement was a first for this conflict and one of the first for the region as a whole in terms of using non-violent action to create political and social change. Israelis, both the people and the government/military, were surprised by the action initially, though many grew to support the notion of the movement after seeing that it was possible to not fight all the time. Many people did, however, not recognize the legitimacy of a non-violent movement and instead continued to be proponents of violent action against the opposing state. This occurred on both sides, and this attitude still heavily contributes to the conflict we see today.

Though the intifada movement didn't become successful in stopping the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it did bring attention to the plight of the Palestinians that resulted from Israeli occupation. It demonstrated that violence didn't have to be the answer, even in a region where many think that violence is all that occurs. It also inspired many other movements in the future and continues to be a teaching point within the subject of non-violent social movements. The fact that we're still talking about it says something.

Rentier States and MENA

According to Beblawi's Four Points, rentier states rely on an economy that is predominately focused on external income, with those generating this 'rent' being a very few number of people. The majority of people within rentier economies distribute or utilize the rent, not create it. In addition, Beblawi states that rentier incomes mainly go to the government when all is said and done. These characteristics are not supportive of healthy economies, and we can see this through the usage of the rentier state formula in the MENA region.

For the majority of actual rentier states, this type of economy does not benefit the people because most income is coming from foreign investments and most of the income itself is not going to social and economic programs within the country. When an economy relies so much on foreign dollars, how can a country support itself and develop into a strong economy through the creation of local business and transaction? In an international crisis, will the rentier state collapse due to the reliance on foreign capital? On top of this, many governments within the region don't invest in economic and social development programs that can benefit much of their populations. They instead spend much of the rent on the military, high government positions, and the elite. Charles Tilly says rentier states are not healthy because citizens don't pay many, if not any, taxes, which is also not good for developing beneficial state programs within the country. There can also be dissent among the populace due to the fact that their government is controlling very large amounts of money that don't seem to be going to things that benefit the public. The state and the people are virtually acting on totally separate economic fields, which can lead to greater disconnect and greater elitism.

There are multiple states within the MENA region that could qualify as a rentier state. Egypt, of which Beblawi is himself, is one of those. It is the most populated country in MENA and has one of the largest economies. Much of its rent comes from foreign aid (heavily invested in the military) and tolls on the Suez Canal. Unlike a 'traditional rentier state', Egyptians do pay some taxes, but not enough that it competes with foreign investments. Even if Egypt's economy were to rapidly grow and become extremely successful overnight, the people would not reap the benefits. There is too much of a gap between state's wallet and the people's wallet. This, along with the many other risks of heavily relying on foreign investment, is what is wrong with the rentier formula. It hurts the populace because  the decisions of the citizenry rarely get taken into account, all while the state continues to benefit economically (of which they are not spending on the actual people).

Rentier States

In a rentier state the government relies on substantial external rent in order to sustain the economy and lacks a strong productive domestic center. In the MENA region in many cases, this means that the government of a state will have the money that they make from oil equal to almost their entire percentage of their budget revenue. This alone fosters an environment where citizens of a state aren’t as involved in what happens in their state’s politics because they are contributing to it with their money, hence widening the disconnect between a state and its citizens. the goverentmant is also the primary reciever of the external rent which again creates a major wealth gap between the government, and the people. The majority of the people in the state aren’t directly involved with the money that is being made from oil and are only involved with distributing it or utilizing it, creating more levels of disconnect and also fosters a sense lack of legitimacy in the government.

Civil Society

The concept of civil society has many different conceptualizations, which emphasizes its complexity. There is really no commonly agreed upon definition beyond the basic idea that civil society is an arena of voluntary, uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values.

The status of MENA civil society is not a good at all. Although civil society has played large roles in democratic transitions all over the world like Latin America and Eastern Europe, it hasn’t helped MENA nearly at all. There are really several as to why many believe that is. The main question in Africa is whether the concept of civil society is even applicable in the geographical context. It is understood that conditions for Western-type civil society are mostly absent in Africa. Africa knows only traditional associations but has no space for a civil society that aims at participatory governance (also known as democracy). Africa has not known a time when they did not have this traditional sense of government. Others argue that the weak development of civil society is partly due to the generally low level of development that hinders societies to further differentiate and to offer opportunities for civil society activities.

I believe that civil society in MENA is very weak. The division among the people and the development of radical regimes, and their actions have resulted in little effective action from the civil society because of Sisi's targeted approach and the Muslim Brotherhood's inability to unite the Egyptian people. Civil society in MENA has been unable to fulfill its seven roles and states' powers have gone unchecked in the MENA region as a result of their ineffectiveness. I think it isn't making political participation even look like an alternative, let alone a better one.

Non-Violent Movements: The Intifada

During the Intifada, Palestinians focused the bulk of their efforts on nonviolent resistance. As Zunes notes, the Intifada employed strategic use of boycotts, strikes, tax refusals, and alternative institutions. Although the movement did not fully accomplish its goals, it made headway in both Palestine and Israel, transforming the way the relations and communications are achieved today. Despite its outcome, the Intifada succeeded in forcing Jordan to relinquish strongholds over the West Bank, persuading the PLO to take political initiative, igniting seeds of doubt in the minds of Israelis, and mobilizing and empowering Palestinians. 

The Intifada challenged the social structure and organization of Palestinian society as a whole. First of all, the movement paved the way for a new role of women in society. Women began to have a more public role in their participation in the national struggle and began to openly call themselves feminists. This allowed for women to not only participate in the movement to a greater degree, but for the first time call for an agenda that catered to a civil code that promoted equality. Additionally, the Intifada initially provided for a strong sense of local organization and unity. Palestinians were able to band together to coordinate nonviolent actions and such demonstrations empowered the people. However, as the movement grew over time, oppressive violent action against Palestinians only served to increase thereby demoralizing the people of the occupied territories and causing tactics to become reactionary rather than progressive.

Looking at the Israeli society, government, and army as a whole, the Intifada created a prevailing mentality of confusion. Among the general populace, the images of nonviolent peoples being attacked, arrested, and prosecuted by armed soldiers challenged the notion that the occupation was vital to Israeli security. In turn, the Israeli populace exerted greater pressures on their government to withdraw from the occupied territory and subsequently gave rise to groups such as the 21s Year. The military echoed the moral concerns of Israeli society, however, there was no serious dissent. The government while seemingly opening more channels of communication with Palestinians through multiple accords generated justifications to fail to live up to their agreements. While the Intifada initially made headway by empowering Palestinians and shocking Israelis, ultimately, the movement failed to accomplish its end game. Hopefully, however, the nonviolent movement laid the foundations for an eventual solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Rentier States and Legitimacy

With the rentier state, citizens view the government as beholden to their rent. Looking at Jordan, a non oil exporting state with a weak tax collection system, the large external rent that the Jordanian government is dependent on is foreign aid. First of all, since the money is single handedly flowing from the hands of Western super powers, the citizens view the government as a puppet of the West. An incident that illustrates this principle most vividly is Jordan's adoption of 1989 IMF sponsored economic programs, including privatization. Rather than catering to the majority of the citizenry, the programs favored the business elite and the King's loyalist supporters. The privatization dislocated Jordanian youth and East Bankers - Palestinians - who depended on work through state-owned enterprises. The new policies encouraged private enterprises to turn these workers away due to a newfound preference for foreign laborers willing to work below market wages. In this situation, it is clear that the rentier economy exacerbates the disconnect between citizen and government because the regime is not accountable to its citizens through a strong tax collection system, rather it is accountable to the Western superpowers who control the rent that supports the state's economy. This disconnect damages the legitimacy of rentier states in the eyes of the citizen because it highlights the government's weaknesses and shortcomings.

Rentier States

According to Beblawi, a rentier state is different from interventionist states in that the economy is based in large part on "rent" from external countries. These rentier states therefore rely heavily on other countries in order to support their economy. As a result, they do not have a strong export economy and rely heavily on imports. Since external factors are the basis for the economy, it can cause a disconnect between the state and the citizens. It can be hard to be loyal to a country or have a personal stake in it if your taxes are barely helping the country compared to external rent. It might make citizens feel that their country is not that powerful and is simply being exploited by other countries for their resources. Rentier states also may cause their citizens to feel insignificant in the grand scheme of things because their money doesn't really help or change their country. Their tax money, which is significantly less than the money received from other states, is less important to the government. If the government's people are not seen as that important, then it can cause further disconnect between the people and government. Beblawi states that one of the most important characteristics of a rentier state is that the states government is the main beneficiary of the rent. Many rentier states receive a very large sum of money from other states, but that money usually does not go directly to the people. It usually, and especially in the MENA region, makes the government wealthy with little of the rentier money going to the people. This can cause even more disconnect because the government becomes wealthy while the people can only watch. This can cause resentment towards the government. 

Non-Violent Social Movements

The Palestinian Intifada achieved a lot considering its ultimate failure to rid the West Bank and Gaza of Israeli rule.  According to Zunes, the Intifada used mostly non-violent means to achieve their goals contrary to popular belief.  During the very first year that the Intifada was around, they peacefully forced Jordan to give up authority of the West Bank and to recognize and endorse the Palestinian cause.  The Intifada also helped the Palestine Liberation Organization to gain recognition as a negotiating partner with Israel and the U.S.  Lastly, the Intifada made gains in creating more cooperation among the Palestinian people who lived in the Israeli occupied territory.  Israel made small concessions in 1993 according to these achievements however, the Palestinians ultimately did not get its land back because as Zunes puts it, "Israel [wanted] the land, not the people."

The Intifada impacted many different groups.  The Palestinians completely restructured their societal system by finally showing the Israelis they were no longer willing to cooperate.  Through their non-violence, the Palestinians were not viewed as terrorists anymore, but rather as people with a legitimate national cause.  However, the Palestinians were not only affected positively.  Dajani put it well when he said that the Intifada acted as a "double-edged sword."  While their cause was strengthened through their efforts, they were also more repressed by the Israelis each day.

Lastly, the Israeli people were affected in various ways.  They were initially very taken aback that the Intifada was able to achieve what they did.  They lashed out with violence because they did not want to give up all they had worked to gain in the 1967 war.  The Israelis realized that they were a lot less secure in the Arab world than they had at first thought.  As a result, some Israelis stood with the Intifada because they felt that they're oppression was unjust and was hurting the Israeli government along with the Palestinians.  Others believed more violence was the answer and that is why there is still conflict in this region today.
  

The Legitimacy of Rentier States

Unlike in an interventionist state, in a rentier state the government relies on substantial external rent (from outside of the state) to sustain the economy and lacks a strong productive domestic center. In the MENA region in many cases, this means that the government of a state will have the money that they make from oil equal to 90/95% of their budget revenue. This fosters an environment where citizens of a state aren’t as involved as what happens in their state’s politics because it isn’t their money that is being utilized by the government, further widening the disconnect between a state and its citizens. Another typical quality of a rentier state is that the government of the state is the principal recipient of the external rent and therefor creates a major wealth disparity between the government, and the people. The majority of the people in the state aren’t directly involved with the money that is being made from oil and are only involved with distributing it or utilizing it, creating more levels of disconnect and also fosters a sense lack of legitimacy in the government.

Rentier States

In most rentier states, there is a large disconnect between the citizens and those in power. Because the rent a state collects is usually used to provide privileges to the political elite in exchange for loyalty to the state, the priorities of the ruling elite are always superior to the priorities of the citizens. Furthermore, the rewards handed out by those in power are not given to citizens based on their merit or performance, but on perceived loyalty to the state and to those in power. This does not provide any incentives or rewards to citizens who work to benefit the state, so the motivation for citizens to respect and support those in power is low, if not nonexistent. By ignoring the citizens within the state, the people in power create a considerable divide between themselves and the citizens within the state. 

For example, if we look at Jordan, considered a non-oil-exporting rentier state, the state has a weak tax system, and the distribution of foreign aid lies solely in the hands of the royal family, so the political elite reap most of the benefits of this aid while the citizens do not benefit at all. And even when the money does go back into helping society as a whole, the services and systems created for the citizens within the state are low quality and under-funded. So logically, this disconnect between those in power (the political elite) and the citizens would delegitimize the authority within the rentier state as seen through the eyes of its citizens, because the governments' decisions are not made with the interests of all citizens in mind, but are politically motivated and based on loyalty to the state. 

Rentier States

A rentier state is less legitimate in the eyes of its populous because the rentier economy hurts  political participation by increasing the disconnect between a state and its citizens. Since only a few control the resources, it leaves the majority of the population with no direct participation in the production, sale, or export of the resource collecting rent. For example, Hazem Beblawi includes the statistic that an average oil producing rentier state's oil revenue represents 90% of budget revenue. It also represents 95% exports. However, only 2% to 3%  of the labor force is engaged in production and distribution of this oil wealth.

Because most of the income is centralized in the production and exportation of a concise resource, there are virtually no taxes imposed on the people of a rentier state. Virtually no taxes mean that citizens are less demanding in terms of political participation. Nationals take on a rentier mentality, which is a breakup of the tradition social contract between the state and its people; a contract that the state will give the people aid and benefits in exchange for their consent. Without this social bond, there is a huge lack of accountability and connection between the few in charge of the government and resources and the rest of the population. This increases the oligarchy or hierarchy and decreases political legitimacy and participation.

This can be seen in Saudi Arabia where 80% of the budget revenue and 40% of GDP comes from exportation. This rentier economy is controlled by the monarchy. The monarchy then uses its funds from the oil to buy tribal loyalty. However, this system has its limits. For example, Roger Owen argues that such systems produce the King's Dilemma, which is a lack of modernization and diversification of the economy. Since rentier economies are not forced to be self sustaining due to foreign cash flow, there is no incentive for economic diversification. This keeps the economy static and increases unemployment rates which further increases disconnect and dissent.

Rentier States

In the eyes of its citizens, a rentier state is probably less legitimate since it relies on foreign income and aid. A rentier state is not able to stand alone. A rentier economy most likely hurts the problem of disconnect between the state and the citizens. Since the government has an elite who control the income, the citizens are less in their eyes. There is a hierarchy within the government creating an obvious and direct divide between the state and the citizens. Citizens are not taxed in rentier states. This, again, creates a chasm between the state, which whom pays the taxes, and the citizens, who lower their demand for political participation. With lower demand for political participation, the elite can control with the government for a longer time. According to Charles Tilly, the state is essentially a protection racket. Imagining the state as a protection item, it is inferable to me that the state has more power than the citizens do. With all of these aspects of rentier states, the relationship between the state and all of its citizens is usually a negative, unequal one. Reliance on other countries as a way of aid and revenue, makes a country less legitamate in the eyes of it's citizens.  

Non-Violent Social Movements

As you know by now, 'non-violent' struggle is not about sitting around in circles singing Kumbaya. Quite the contrary, it's a highly strategic enterprise that usually entails significant risks to personal safety for those who take part. Zunes gives several examples of non-violent struggle in the MENA region while Dajani discusses the effectiveness of non-violent resistance in the first Palestinian Intifada. As we know twenty-five years later, the Intifada didn't lead to a resolution of the conflict. What did it achieve, if anything? What impact did it have on both the Palestinian and Israeli societies?

Rentier States and Legitimacy

Thus far, we have talked about the big interventionist state, which is simultaneously quite weak in legitimacy. Do you think a rentier state is more or less legitimate in the eyes of its citizens? In other words, does a rentier economy help or hurt the problem of a disconnect between state and citizens? Provide a clear rationale for your argument.