Non-Violent Social Movements

Following Israel's victory in the 6 Day War of 1967, the nation drastically expanded t's borders. After the war Israel came to occupy the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights, and the Palestinians who lived in these areas. After the war, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, formed in 1964, continued the conflict against the Israelis. The PLO engaged in some terrorist activities against Israeli civilian and military targets, but also used non-violent protests in order to achieve an independent Palestinian state.
In opposition to the growing numbers of Israeli setters moving into the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, the Palestinians launched the first Intifada in the 1980s. The tactics used in the first Intifada included boycotting Israeli products and refusing to pay taxes. When the IDF cracked don on these measures, violence began. The ensuing conflict saw terrible bloodshed on both sides, with over 100 Israelis killed and over 2,000 Palestinians. The conflict also saw the first use of suicide bombings in 1993, that killed 2 and injured around a dozen. The conflict had a tremendous affect on the policies of both the Israelis and the Palestinians. In 1993, both sides came to the negotiating table in the Oslo Accords. They provided self-government in the Palestinian territories in return for the recognition of the State of Israel. These talks were followed by a second the second Oslo Accords. When neither provided an independent Palestinian state, the dissatisfied Palestinian youth engaged in the much more violent, Second Intifada.

Civil Society

The term civil society does not have a fixed definition, and is in fact very difficult to define. Depending on what one considers to be civil society, it can be defined in many different ways. However, most agree that civil society is not business, and is not government. It can be thought of as a space in which organizations, individuals, and groups interact and share ideas. It can also foster social movements.

In the MENA region, there are many restrictions on civil society. Some countries fear the threat civil society may present, and try to limit its activity. However, in cases like the Arab Spring uprisings and the first intifada, civil society can bring about large-scale social movements despite the constraints.

Civil society can provide avenues for frustrated or dissatisfied citizens to unite with others and demand changes from their government. These demands sometimes escalate to full-scale social movements, but sometimes are quelled after the demands are met, or are crushed by the regime. 

Stifling A Movement: Sisi puts 237 activists on trial for protesting against him

After Mubarak, the youth of Egypt had received a taste of the power of the collective. Nevertheless, the newly elected President Sisi has learned from his predecessors' mistakes. Systematically, he disbanded any semblance of political awareness among the youth to the point where he recently put 237 activists on trial. What do we learn from this? Social movements will only prevail if the government in power is more concerned with paying attention to criticism for the betterment of the country instead of trying to hold on to office. 

Although many of the civil societies had disbanded after the resignation of Mubarak, there had been many promises made by the newly elected government to delegate with the leaders of social movements. There were some youth coalitions set in place to advocate for their needs and demands, After five years, all traces of such improvements are all but gone.

This just goes to show that a social movement cannot prevail without a platform available. There has to be more acceptance by the government or history will keep repeating itself and the masses shall win

Non-violent Resistance

While non-violent resistance did not lead to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it was not entirely a failure. It brought the concerns of the Palestinians to the world, and helped them gain more international attention and support. Additionally, because Palestine was (and still is) less militarily powerful than Israel, they were able to do this without a military confrontation. As we can see from the wars between the two in recent years, Palestine will not win through force. The non-violent tactics used in the intifada forced Israel to change some of its policies and actions, and non-violent demonstrations in Budrus, Bil'in, and other Palestinian villages have been successful in the years following the intifada. 

In Palestine, the non-violent tactics of the intifada allowed women to become more involved and, in some cases, leaders and integral participants. Unfortunately, divisions within the Palestinian community regarding their ultimate goals and the tactics they believed would help them achieve these goals lead to the intifada not achieving its aims. While the intifada strengthened the community and resolve among Palestinians, it also lead to some feeling jaded and hopeless. This hopelessness fostered violence. 

In Israel, the intifada forced some to accept that "occupying another people would neither guarantee peace nor security", and that the occupation of Palestine was not sustainable. However, the actions of the Israeli government did not reflect this, and an occupation remains present to this day. 

Social Movement in Tunisia

Social Movements have found success in the MENA region recently. Lets analyze why that may be the case. The main reason why people might oppose the preexisting government is because of their stance on many issues. For example, how oppressive are they? Are they interacting with their opposition or just stifling any criticism? As Gene Sharp mentions, social movements have different effects in different areas according to the culture and the already existing platform for social movements.  

We must first consider how legitimate a current or standing government might be. Time and again, we have encountered leaders in the region whom the people feel a lack of trust for. In Tunisia the disparity between the government and the people is evident. This might be because Ben Ali’s regime was accused of corruption and the state was plagued by oppression from the elite.The government provided no support to its people. This catalyzed the social movement in Tunisia

Tunisia was also not a military state therefore, the police or military were not particularly inclined to either support the standing government or arrest and harass protesters.

Strong vs Weak MENA States

The strength of a MENA state (i.e. its ability to suppress revolutionary insurrection) stems from the support of two groups: its constituency and its allies.

Hazem Beblawi contends that MENA states can afford to break social contracts with their constituencies because of the nature of their rentier economies: People do not require or expect representation in government because they often have zero or little commitment in terms of taxation. To some extent, I agree with Beblawi. But I also think that a state can derive more strength if it has the support of the people it represents. For example, in Palestine, an entire faction of Hamas (the political organization, not the al-Qassam Brigades) is dedicated to providing people social services and managing pensions. Not everyone in Palestine likes Hamas, but those who benefit from the social services at least recognize some of the benefits they receive. If a revolutionary social movement is to be successful in retaining power after they seize it, the movement must find a way to provide or improve upon the services that the former administration provided, else people will be discontented with the new administration and may rebel. This is precisely what occurred in 2013 in Egypt, and what occurred after the deposition of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s. So the support of its constituency lends a state strength, and a social movement must win over that support if it is to be successful in the long term.

Support of allies also lends a state strength and may allow it to suppress social movements. Conversely, making additional external enemies may weaken a state and diminish its ability to stay in power. In Libya, for example, the Gaddafi regime found itself to be the focus of the pique of the United States and its NATO-backed coalition in 2011. The social movement in Libya surely would have failed had not air strikes by NATO decimated the state's infrastructure. The state, therefore, was essentially weakened because of how it was perceived by other world powers.

Understanding the Arab Revolts: Comparing Egypt and Syria

In order for a revolutionary movement to be successful, revolutionary sentiment must be widespread, interconnected, and rapidly spreading. In Egypt, there were a number of heterogeneous groups calling for the ousting of Mubarak in 2011 and Morsi in 2013. While each group operated independently in different areas of Cairo (and the rest of the country), they coordinated their social movements to attain a common goal. When movements do not coordinate, such as in Bahrain or, to some extent, Syria, the state may simply play social-movement-whack-a-mole until the insurrection becomes depleted of resources. This is precisely what happened in Bahrain as well. Looking beyond the Middle East, historical uprisings in Venezuela and China were stopped in their tracks after they were contained. If the uprising in Egypt, which began in Tahrir Square, was quelled immediately by the state, then the insurrection may have failed. But the state struggled to contain the spread of revolutionary sentiment to other parts of Cairo and greater Egypt, and its resources were spread too thin as groups began to pop up and rebel at every corner. Therefore, revolutions in Egypt were successful (in both 2011 and 2013) because of how quickly and broadly revolutionary sentiment expanded. The nature of Egypt's rentier economy surely helped revolutionary sentiment expand more quickly than otherwise. In his cornerstone work, Hazem Beblawi concluded that the average MENA rentier state's revenue from oil exports represents 90% of its budget revenue and oil represents 95% of the state's exports. However, only two to to three percent of the labor force is engaged in the production and distribution of this oil wealth, leaving society stratified between two groups--those who partake in the state's riches and those who do not. Since one large, physically widespread group of people felt betrayed by the state, they were able to overwhelm the state quickly and cohesively.


In Syria, however, independent factions within the Free Syrian Army and other rebel groups operate with relative independence and disunity, and their efforts are too spread out to do significant damage. In her work on state authoritarianism, Eva Bellin concludes that a state may remain in power if it develops strong international support networks. The Assad regime in Syria has successfully gained the support of Russia, and Russian military aid and air support has been instrumental in fortifying the Assad regime's whack-a-mole finesse. While the Syrian opposition is surely not a nonviolent social movement, some elements of it are, and it began that way. Revolutionary sentiment was slow to cultivate, which gave the Assad regime time to fracture the movement. According to Eric Trager, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Assad's containment of the rebellion to certain cities or certain parts of cities is instrumental to his ability to stay in power. He has effectively cut the flow of support and aid between opposition groups; divided, they may eventually fall. 

Social Movements and Democratization

Generally, the reason that social movements work in the MENA region is due to a few factors that we have looked at in this class. When analyzing these social movements, it is important to look at the legitimacy of the state government and how successful the movement was in mobilizing the people. While social movements have taken place throughout the region, there are places where these circumstances have led to the movement being much more successful in some places than in others.  

First, looking at the legitimacy of the state government, social movements are more likely to be successful when there is a divide and a lack of trust between the populace and the government. Looking at Tunisia, there was a disconnect between the government and the people as Ben Ali’s regime was viewed as corrupt and the state was plagued by wealth inequality. The government provided little support for the populace, and the regime was out of touch. This made it easier for a social movement to occur because most people did not feel strong ties the the regime.

Secondly, because of the use of social media, the movement was relatively successful in mobilizing the people. Unlike in prior decades, the use of the internet contributed to the success of the social movement because people had a new way of connecting that they had previously not had access to. Over the past decade, internet usage in Tunisia has risen exponentially, so mobilizing people became much easier. There was also a lack of response from polices forces as Ben Ali and his regime did not hold much power over the military. For this reason, the military was less likely to crack down on mass protests, feeling a stronger connection with the populace than the regime. It seems that in order for a social movement to be successful in the region, there must be a way to mobilize the people and a general divide between the populace and the regime. I think that in the region, social movements provide a platform for people to speak up and to promote the desire for democracy in the state.

Legitimacy and Coercion in Rentier States

Many MENA states are viewed as illegitimate, yet the coercive apparatuses of such states remain strong, because rentier economies create state systems which are detached from their constituencies. For some MENA states, most capital is generated by external rent such as oil export revenue or foreign military financing, which yields excessively low, sometimes nonexistent tax rates.

Such low tax rates provide incentives for foreign nationals to settle in some MENA states, fueling cosmopolitan societies fractured by nationalistic divides. For example, expatriots outnumber UAE nationals by a factor of 9 to 1, which fuels a disunified populous. Such diverse constituencies are common in a number of major cities across MENA--Doha, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Cairo, and others. Yet, though the governments of rentier states may be seen as illegitimate, they retain coercive abilities which make them difficult to depose. 

In her article, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," Eva Bellin outlines four distinct properties of the "coercive apparatus" which allows a disconnected government to retain power in the rentier state system:

• Fiscal health

• Successful maintenance of international support networks

• Level of institutionalization (patrimonial logic with cronyism, or meritocratic and operating with a 'higher purpose')

• The degree to which it faces a high level of popular mobilization

Though fiscal health has been waning as a result of decreased oil prices, many MENA states remain entrenched in patrimonial logic and connected to international support networks from which they derive power and legitimacy, especially allies like China, Russia, and sometimes the United States. Therefore, some efforts toward popular mobilization have been squelched, as was the case in Bahrain and, to some extent, Syria. 

Social Movements and Democratization

There are two main challenges to social movements functioning as an avenue of democratic participation in the MENA region. The first of these challenges is that many of these movements lack the ability to mobilize large portions of the population. The population may fear repercussions from the state security apparatus, or having never had a real taste of democracy, may view the movement's attempt as futile. However, in a revolutionary movement this may not occur and the population may be sufficiently mobilized, based on the fact that they may perceive that the winds of change have arrived and the regime will have to listen

The second challenge that both revolutionary and non-revolutionary social movements face in the MENA region is the response of the regime. In many cases the regime does not tolerate any form of mobilization as this is perceived as a threat to its power and control over the people. In cases where the social movement is allowed to pursue some sort of democratic avenue, usually only in non-revolutionary movements, the regime still attempts to render the movement impotent. Sham parliaments and elections are examples of this strategy and show the willingness of almost all regimes in the MENA region to not allow for any change that would in any way affect the state's power and control. 

MENA and Neoliberalism

In 1945, following the end of World War Two, the IMF and World Bank were created. In today’s age of globalization, systems like the IMF and World Bank have become extremely powerful institutions. The World Bank focuses on financing and investing in developing nations while the IMF improves global economic cooperation by stabilizing nation’s economies. This is done primarily through making loans available to developing nations during an unforeseen economic troubles. But in order to obtain these loans, a country must agree to many austerity cuts and shifts in it’s political and economic system. The IMF and World Bank’s demands of struggling nations are called “structural adjustment.” These usually include, a major reduction in government spending, privatization of industry, and a deregulation of the economy. Unfortunately, many states depend on the IMF’s loans and are thus beholden to their wishes over the wishes of their own people. The IMF’s calls for privatization and liberalization of the economic sector are part of the “Washington Consensus.” It’s a belief held by many policymakers that austerity and privatization are necessary for economic growth in developing nations. Instead of improving the lives of people in the developing world, the policies called for by the “Washington Consensus” have caused standards of living for people with fixed income to decline. Many skilled workers and unions have found that once the IMF’s policies have been enacted, employment and high wages are harder to find. Though many have suffered due to the policies of the IMF, the “Washington Consensus” has not changed. In fact, many believe that their failures were result of them not going far enough.  

Rentier States and Legitimacy

A rentier state is heavily reliant on the rents and profits derived from the rent generated from outside actors in return for access to the state’s natural resources. In a renteir state, only a small amount of the population is involved in the generation of wealth from the rents. The majority of the population is involved in the distribution. The government of a renteir state benefits the most from the system, as it is the main recipient of the wealth from the rents. The Middle East, specifically the oil rich Gulf Nations, are perfect examples of renteir states. These nations are extremely dependent on revenue generated from the oil that exists within their borders. According to Forbes, In Saudi Arabia “the petroleum sector accounts for roughly 80% of budget revenues, 45% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings.” One of the main problems with renterir states is their lack of legitimacy with their people. In most renteir states, the citizens pay virtually no taxes. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates collect no taxes on their citizens. Since oil is plentiful in these nations, taxation is seen as an alternative and unneeded source of income. A government that relies on a taxed citizenry to function provides the people with leverage over the government. Citizen tax payers can use this leverage in order to extract concessions from the state, specifically greater political participation. Without this leverage, the government has no incentive to allow for representation. This is why governments in the Middle East and North Africa are typically weak. The state refuses to represent the people so the people feel no allegiance to the state. This failure in creating a functioning citizen state relationship explains the numerous internal conflicts occurring across the region. There are ongoing armed conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Libya, and in Yemen. Almost all are civil wars. These conflicts show that there is a widening gap between the people and their government.

Strong versus Weak States

It is very hard to say whether a typical MENA state is strong or weak. Oftentimes, the nations that are traditionally strong, like Saudi Arabia, for instance, have strong militaries that are disconnected from their people. While these nations are often economically prosperous due to oil, they are not necessarily strong in all regards. While these states may appear to be strong externally, many are just the opposite internally. Many people in MENA states harbor apathetic or even negative feelings towards their government. The colonial era caused there to be an abundance of unnatural rulers in countries with artificial borders (Owen 40). This in turn has established a precedent of dissatisfaction. So while many MENA nations have strong militaries and have strict rules, that doesn't necessarily mean they are strong. This raises the question of what being strong really means. Does strength lie in how a country is perceived by outsiders or by how it is perceived by its own people? Do only external results matter or does the prosperity and connectivity of the people to the government in regards to strength? There isn't necessarily a correct answer, because it is hard to generalize an entire country as "strong" or "weak". Nothing is black and white. Instead, it is more accurate to say that countries are strong in certain aspects, but also weak in other aspects. It is up to the individual whether that translates into an overall strength or a weakness.