Understanding the Arab Revolts: Comparing Egypt and Syria

In order for a revolutionary movement to be successful, revolutionary sentiment must be widespread, interconnected, and rapidly spreading. In Egypt, there were a number of heterogeneous groups calling for the ousting of Mubarak in 2011 and Morsi in 2013. While each group operated independently in different areas of Cairo (and the rest of the country), they coordinated their social movements to attain a common goal. When movements do not coordinate, such as in Bahrain or, to some extent, Syria, the state may simply play social-movement-whack-a-mole until the insurrection becomes depleted of resources. This is precisely what happened in Bahrain as well. Looking beyond the Middle East, historical uprisings in Venezuela and China were stopped in their tracks after they were contained. If the uprising in Egypt, which began in Tahrir Square, was quelled immediately by the state, then the insurrection may have failed. But the state struggled to contain the spread of revolutionary sentiment to other parts of Cairo and greater Egypt, and its resources were spread too thin as groups began to pop up and rebel at every corner. Therefore, revolutions in Egypt were successful (in both 2011 and 2013) because of how quickly and broadly revolutionary sentiment expanded. The nature of Egypt's rentier economy surely helped revolutionary sentiment expand more quickly than otherwise. In his cornerstone work, Hazem Beblawi concluded that the average MENA rentier state's revenue from oil exports represents 90% of its budget revenue and oil represents 95% of the state's exports. However, only two to to three percent of the labor force is engaged in the production and distribution of this oil wealth, leaving society stratified between two groups--those who partake in the state's riches and those who do not. Since one large, physically widespread group of people felt betrayed by the state, they were able to overwhelm the state quickly and cohesively.


In Syria, however, independent factions within the Free Syrian Army and other rebel groups operate with relative independence and disunity, and their efforts are too spread out to do significant damage. In her work on state authoritarianism, Eva Bellin concludes that a state may remain in power if it develops strong international support networks. The Assad regime in Syria has successfully gained the support of Russia, and Russian military aid and air support has been instrumental in fortifying the Assad regime's whack-a-mole finesse. While the Syrian opposition is surely not a nonviolent social movement, some elements of it are, and it began that way. Revolutionary sentiment was slow to cultivate, which gave the Assad regime time to fracture the movement. According to Eric Trager, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Assad's containment of the rebellion to certain cities or certain parts of cities is instrumental to his ability to stay in power. He has effectively cut the flow of support and aid between opposition groups; divided, they may eventually fall.