Why has the MENA region been so resistant to democratic reform? In light of the Arab Revolts of 2011, what do you think of Bellin's argument? How would she explain what happened in Tunisia and Egypt?
Also, is it accurate to say, as some do, that the region's civil society is "weak and... an ineffective champion of democracy" (Bellin 2005: 22)?
The idea of democratization in the MENA region has always brought skepticism. There are several factors that contribute to this resistance of democracy in the MENA region. For one, democracy is a western ideology and most MENA states don’t align exactly with these ideas. However, Bellin bring up a great point in saying that most scholars say that this region has a weak civil society, state control of economy, poverty, and cultural difference. Yet, Bellin argues that the MENA region has these “prerequisites of democratization” but, no one has had the ability to successful revolt against this government and start a democratic transition. Bellin argues that the West continues to support several non-democratic regimes in the region in the interest of security. Even though other regions in the world have an ineffective vote for the people, nonetheless, these factors also explain why the MENA region has been resistant to democratic reform. After the Arab Revolt in 2011, Bellin’s argument that MENA is not unique in lacking these prerequisites, but has still managed to resist democratization is still relevant. In Tunisia and Egypt, we saw the West yield to popular uprisings and call on the authoritarian dictators to step down. However, this was only significant because both countries relied on foreign backing to prop up their regimes; as we saw in Egypt when the US threatened to stop backing the military, the military abandoned Mubarak. Bellin would likely say that the reason that these nations had revolutions was because their civil society had a strong voice and mobilized despite an environment not conducive to legal revolution. Although we can still see Bellin’s argument today, I don’t think Bellin is accurate in saying that the civil societies are weak. I do think it was interesting for Bellin to disagree with most scholars and bring up the idea that change is possible with the right successful movements. However, this region still deals with this resistance of democracy today
ReplyDeleteThe MENA region has been resistant to democratic reform due it’s different historical roots and contexts from the western world. Nations within the MENA region lack or have not fully developed certain societal aspects which create a strong foundation for democratic reform such as a democratic culture. In light of the Arab Revolts in 2011, Bellin’s argument still stands strong that these regions lack certain aspects for democratic reform. Despite uprisings and governmental changes, many nations that were involved in the Arab Revolts did not become democratic nations. These events strengthen the part of her argument which states that these regions have not be lacking in democratic impulse, but there is still something missing which makes it difficult for democracy to form (Bellin, 23). In regards to how Bellin may explain what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, I imagine she would say that these were strong civil societies but the government had high institutionalization and the fiscal health of the nations were not strong enough. I do not believe it is accurate to say that the entire region’s civil society is weak, perhaps it would be more appropriate to look nation by nation to determine what their civil societies are like. There have been many instances of mass protests in the region which signifies strong civil societies, but there have also been minor protesting within the region which signifies weaker civil societies.
ReplyDeleteReferencing the Bellin reading, resistance to democracy in the MENA region is because the region lacks the perquisites that would allow countries to achieve democracy (Bellin 24). Some causes of the resistance include a weak civil society, low literary, low per capita income, and distance from the democratic epicenter (Bellin 2005: 24). Bellin explains the lack of uprisings that took place in Egypt and Tunisia prior to 2011 due to the “repression of civil society” and the will of the state to smash any uprisings (Bellin 2005:30). The fear of military suppression towards protesters may have also played a role in discouraging “democratic forces” (Bellin 2005:). Bellin would argue that the events in Egypt and Tunisia during 2011 transpired because the state lacked the will to put out the “democratic forces”. Since the heads of state in both countries rely heavily on the military and security to keep their power, the lack of intent to use military force would have made a vacuum where democratic forces could take back the power. All this would lead to the potential for a democracy to arise in a country. However, Egypt, unlike Tunisia, was unable to continue towards democracy which can be explained through dependency on the state for the people’s livelihoods and continued institutionalization of the government. I think it is fair to say that civil society in the region has been ineffective in trying to bring democracy. However, I think state influence on civil society has furthered the ineffectiveness of civil society in the region. State controlled economies, military and security, and patrimonialism all affect the way civil society operates and the state of civil society. Saying that civil society itself is weak in the region may be debatable, but the ineffectiveness of civil society in the region due to the specific state’s influence isn’t quite as debatable.
ReplyDeleteThe most poignant analysis in the Bellin reading is the assertion that democracy is difficult to foster in the Middle East because most states are "geographically remote from the epicenter of democratization" (Bellin 2005:23). To me, this sounds like a validation of the "Domino Theory" made popular during the Cold War. This theory in essence stated that if one state fell to communism, its geographical neighbors would fall to it as well. The reverse of this theory was the notion that if you can foster democracy in one state, its geographical neighbors would follow in suit. In the case of MENA, we don't necessarily see communism spreading itself throughout the region. We do however see the difficulty of promoting democracy in a state surrounded by autocratic neighbors. Democracy can not simply occur in an isolated setting; it must be supported by comparably democratic neighboring states.
ReplyDeleteIn terms of equating the current post Arab Spring period to the Cold War, would authoritarianism necessarily take the place of Communism since it also impedes democratization? Furthermore, when framing the Arab Spring (like the Cold War) as an issue of polarity, as the US declines from its position atop a unipolar world order how will MENA states respond? They may be further influenced by China, which is often seen as the rising power that is shifting the world order towards bi-polarity; however, I don't think a case can be made that any single MENA state will be able to take a position as a substantial player in the new world order, whatever its polarity may be.
DeleteBellin rejects the argument surmised by traditional MENA scholars: that democratization has not occurred due to weak civil society, state controlled economies, poverty, geographic isolation from other democracies, and the overall culture of the region. States lacking all of these prerequisites have managed to democratize in other parts of the world, and thus the region should not be treated as a special case in these regards. Rather, what sets MENA apart is the strength of its coercive apparatuses and their ability to suppress attempts at democratization before they can spread among organized civil society. This strength is primarily garnered as rent from Western democracies, who have vested security interests in the region and continue to rely on MENA's oil reserves. Consequently, I disagree that civil society is a weak and ineffective champion of democracy; it is only weaker than the autocratic regimes that silence its attempts at revolution. A perfect example of this would be the situation in Egypt, in which civil society succeeded in forcing Mubarak to step down but failed in democratization due to the survival of the country's structural autocracy.
ReplyDeleteAs many of the previous blog post have stated the main reason that the region of MENA have a resistance to democracy has a lot to do with being uninformed about the main goal of democracy. Because the people of the region do not have the necessary knowledge and understanding on how to built an effective democracy that can withstand hardship, there is this “resistance” to it. The main causes for such resistance include first and foremost the status of the civil society which usually results from the lack of communication with their government. Specifically for Egypt and Tunisia Bellin presented the idea of “repression of civil society” as well the idea of the power the state has to erase whatever other groups or organizations presenting itself in a way that might threatened the governments place. And because of how isolated region there is always a sense of dependency that the civilization has on the government. State controls everything that happens and most of the information given to the public because of that I truly believe that is where the lack of progress comes from. The state is too busy solidifying their control and making sure that the society stays weak is why individuals perceive the region as a weak state. It’s not that they necessarily are, it’s because the society really has no space to move forward and break away from their dependency.
ReplyDeleteI think it's really interesting what you said about the civil society of the region being uninformed because of the lack of transparency between citizens and their governments. I think a lot of that has to do with many states' statuses as rentier states and the reason why they are able to control almost every aspect of life is because they control most of the economy and can cause a dependency, as you mentioned, of the members of civil society onto the government, thus creating a state that is perceived as "weak" because there is no real loyalty or trust from the civil society to the governments. Rather, the state forces a codependency. As long as the state retains money from its status as a rentier state, they can force civil society to be weak and dependent on the government and repress any attempts at democratic reforms.
DeleteThe usual explanations as to why the MENA region has been so unable to adopt democratic systems are because of weak civil society, an economy controlled by the state, low socioeconomic and educational levels, proximity to other democratic countries, and cultural influence. Many scholars believe that the MENA region cannot begin the process of democratization because they do not have these "prerequisites" for democracy. Bellin, however, has an opposing viewpoint, arguing that other countries/regions who lack the prerequisites have undergone democratic transition and that it is the fault of the region that democratization has yet to happen. I agree that it is up to MENA to create their own democratic destiny, because other countries/regions who were in a similar political and governmental state as MENA have made democratization work. Bellin's question is not why MENA has yet to democratize, but rather why it is not even on a path to democratization, and I agree with the assertion that the region must be committed to collectively and consistently beginning this path. I believe that Bellin would argue that the results of the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt were based on the execution of a solid plan and the systemic strength of the state. Tunisia was able to succeed in democratization because their commitment to democratization and lack of a coercive state allowed them to, but in the case of Egypt, their failure stemmed from a strong coercive state that--even though the revolution was partly successful--negatively affected Egypt's plan for democratization. Although some say that civil societies are "weak and... an ineffective champion of democracy," I believe the opposite (Bellin 2005: 22). Civil societies are the heart and soul of revolution and it is often the role of the civil society to inspire and encourage revolution and freedom from an oppressive regime. Civil societies also bring to light injustices within countries, and without the attention that they put on their unfair government, then it is highly unlikely that another country will intervene. Therefore, it is often up to the citizens to stand up for what they believe in, because if they don't, then there is a big chance that no one else will.
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ReplyDeleteAs argued by Belin, when it comes to discussing resistance to democracy in the MENA region, it is not so much about the factors that are absent as it is about present conditions which actively maintain the prevalence of a coercive apparatus and an authoritarian regime. To develop this argument, it is important to note that in most cases revolutions are a result of cross-class coalitions whereas the active participation of the middle class is particularly important. The structure of MENA countries state administration is such that it favors particular ethnic, sectarian groups and other kinds of elites thus preventing the formation of such coalitions. It is those elites that maintain this patrimonial system of administration so that their personal interests are preserved and thus strengthen the coercive apparatus. It is important to note, that this desire for non-egalitarian ruling was and is present in other regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, however what makes the MENA region unique is that it still enjoys international support which provides MENA states with the necessary rent to sustain fiscal economy and hence keep the security authorities loyal and satisfied. The reasons behind this support are the western views that authoritarian regimes are desirable as long as they seem able to provide the necessary oil supplies and contain the Islamist threats within their countries. This creates a vicious cycle since Western Powers invest money in support of the regimes, whereas the regimes spend the money on maintaining military loyalty by buying weapons from western manufacturers, thus encouraging international support even further. It is this support that boosts the fiscal economies of the regimes and thus keeps the ratio between the repression cost and mass mobilization at levels that are affordable for the state. Essentially, the Western world provides the regimes with the necessary amount of rent to repress mass mobilization. Having this in mind, it would be unfair to characterize the civil society of the region ‘weak’ and ‘innefective’, it would be more accurate to say that the regimes are too strong to overcome. It is interesting to notice that in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, those were the two countries with the greatest access to the internet and social media along with the greatest media coverage from channels such as BBC and Al Jazeera. It’s often the case that although desire for mobilization exists within the masses, the state has the will and the capacity to crush them. In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, the level of mobilization was such that it increased the repression cost to such level that it threatened the internal integrity of the military itself. It is also important to note that in both cases, the military was highly institutionalized and was thus able to foster transition to democracy, as long as it saw this transition as a way of preserving its own interests and legitimacy. The success of the revolts were rather a self-preservation act by the military (especially in Egypt) rather than change of mentality. The difference is that the military in Tunisia saw democratization as the best way of preserving itself, whereas in Egypt this was achieved by changing the head of state.
MENA has been very resistant to democratization because of the institutions and regimes that have been created that suppress revolution and change. Bellin's argument would support this claim because she argues that despite the typical scholarly claim that the region lacks a strong civil society and economy along with poverty and even the culture in the region, the coercive institutions have a greater hand in the fate of democratization in the region. In regards to the Arab Revolts in 2011, Bellin would analyze the success through the revolutionaries' approach to taking down the coercive institutions. In Tunisia, the success of the revolt was due to the revolutionaries' ability to weaken the government and have the president and his entire regime step down from command. Similar to the steps given by Gene Sharp in his book, "From Dictatorship to Democracy", the people opposed to the current coercive leadership must come together in order to weaken the pillars that hold up the institutions. When one goes to compare the situation in Tunisia to the one that occurred Egypt, there are different situations that may lead to different paths to democracy. In Egypt, the revolts were enough to pressure the president to step down from power but the difference from the Tunisian revolts is that although the president stepped down, in Egypt, the regime of the president stayed intact so that it could continue the authoritarian rule. The strength of these regimes lies in the pillars of coercion that keep it stable, powerful, and above the people. In order to bring democracy to the MENA region there needs to be more revolutions for change that will weaken the pillars so that when they fall, the coercive institutions will fall along with it. The argument can be made against some scholarly opinions that the MENA region has a weak civil society. The Arab Spring is evidence of a strong civil society because as a large group, people came together under the goal to obtain more freedom and power within their state. The strength of the protests and revolts show how a large majority of the citizens within the society are aiming towards one particular goal collectively. This is difficult to achieve but through social media, the people are able to bring their voices into one to make it stronger. This is evidence of a very strong civil society and it very unlikely that their civil society is stopping them from achieving the democracies and freedoms they ask for.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Bellin in her assertion that rather than blaming a weak civil society and economy we have to recognize the important roles that the strong coercive institutions play in the MENA region, especially concerning civil societies’ attempts at democratic reform. I agree with Bellin that some MENA scholars overestimate the accountability of civil society when explaining why democratic reforms fail, but it’s obvious, as in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, that sometimes democratic movements are possible despite the other aspects mentioned by Bellin being stacked against the civil society. Clearly democracy is a western ideology and I think that we cannot forget that a main reason why the MENA region has been so resistant to democratic reform is because of the way that many Western colonizing powers left them with fractured governments. The colonized states of the MENA region were left to build their own governments from the corpses of the empires left by the Western colonizers. Because of the region’s access to rent it was easy for many states to establish autocratic, rentier states and I think because of the region’s history of colonization, it was easy to create authoritarian regimes rather than democratic. Also, because of the region’s history of colonization and the colonizing powers’ tendency to create arbitrary boundaries, there was and is to this day a lack of loyalty to one’s country and government and more of a loyalty to one’s clan or tribe. This is only perpetuated by states’ rentier economies which contribute to a disloyalty to the state itself. I think Bellin would agree that this ties into the democratic reforms that happened in Tunisia and Egypt. The Tunisian revolution was caused by high unemployment, food inflation, corruption, a lack of political freedoms like freedom of speech and poor living conditions. Basically the rentier state started to fail civil society and citizens had had enough, which spurred the revolution. When Western powers, who provided the majority of foreign aid to the nations, called upon the dictators of the states to step down this further threatened the rentier states. When the US refused to continue to back Mubarak in Egypt, the military abandoned Mubarak because without the support of the US a major source of rent (foreign aid) would be lost. The Egyptian military realized they could no longer support Mubarak if that meant they would stop receiving foreign aid. Some scholars argue that the region’s civil society is "weak and... an ineffective champion of democracy" (Bellin 2005: 22) however, I believe that it is not necessarily the civil society’s fault. As stated by Bellin, many people in the region are illiterate, live far from the epicenters of democratic reform, and resist democracy simply because of their culture of Islam which has historically opposed democratic movements (Bellin 2005: 23). Because of all these factors, not to mention the governments’ repression of civil society, it is incredibly difficult to create a revolution strong enough to overthrow an authoritarian regime. But clearly, as demonstrated in Egypt and Tunisia, if the people have truly had enough of the oppressive government ruling them, if they can band together and cooperate they really can create change.
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