The Shahbag Movement in Bangladesh

Right now, millions of people are mobilizing in Bangladesh in what we might tentatively call the "Shahbag Movement," since the epicenter of protests is in the Shahbag district of Dhaka. We don't hear much about it in the global media, because apparently a week of sustained non-violent popular mobilization for justice isn't quite as interesting as the kind of stories that fit the narrative of rampant Muslim extremism across the Islamic world. To be fair, CNN did cover the initial stage of protests, but since it has developed into a massive non-violent movement nationwide, as opposed to chaotic street violence, they seem to have lost interest.

So what is going on and why is it of interest to us in this class? I want to make two key points in this post: First, the Shahbag Movement in Bangladesh is an example of a broad-based, non-violent mobilization of ordinary people who are trying to change their political reality. It represents a rejection of impunity and religious extremism. Second, despite its massive scope and, thus far, sustained character (protests have been going on for about a week), we hear basically nothing about it in our regular media outlets. It is a perfect example of how selective our media coverage is and should serve as a reminder to us all that we have to work hard to stay informed about the world.

The protests began when the first verdicts in the ongoing war crimes trials were announced. The trials, initiated in 2010, address crimes committed during the 1971 Liberation War against Pakistan, in which Bangladesh gained independence. At the center of the trials is the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which opposed Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan and collaborated with Pakistani forces during the liberation struggle. These were days when intellectuals were rounded up and murdered, women were systematically raped in the hundreds of thousands, and entire villages were erased from existence. The spark for the current protests was the verdict against prominent JI leader Abdul Quader Mollah, who was accused of killing 344 civilians. To the dismay of the families of the victims of 1971, who have been waiting for justice for more than 40 years, he was sentenced to life imprisonment - not the death penalty. But the protests are not simply pushing for the hanging of Mollah - it is not a movement driven by vengeance - it is representative of a broader sense of selective justice and a reaction against the Islamist agenda of JI. It should be noted that JI won less than five seats out of 300 in the latest parliamentary elections in 2008. Their power is derived from their potential role as 'kingmakers,' not from being a strong force in society. 

Bangladesh was born out of a secular struggle. It was very much a cultural and intellectual movement, a reaction against the notion that because they were Muslim, the people of Bangladesh (then "East Pakistan") should be tied to and controlled by (then 'West') Pakistan. At the center of the cultural struggle was the language, Bangla (Bangladesh means "land of Bangla"), and while a predominantly Muslim nation, the national identity has been built around culture, not religion. What we see in the streets of Dhaka right now, and spreading across the country, is a revival of the spirit of 1971 - it is at once a rejection of the islamist agenda of JI and their likes, an expression of a popular demand for justice for those who were massacred, and a rejection of a culture of impunity that often prevails in post-conflict environments.

Whether the Shahbag Movement will leave a lasting legacy will depend on its ability to avoid political co-option from the dominant political parties (note: a movement being co-opted is different from a movement cultivating elite allies and capitalizing on those alliances), and its ability to articulate specific demands beyond the hanging of Mollah. This is not a revolutionary movement in the strict sense; the people in the streets are not seeking the fall of the government. As such, it is likely to face significant challenges in drafting a concrete 'mission statement,' but early signs would suggest that, at the very least, the movement has already succeeded in reviving the spirit of 1971, which could serve as an important watershed moment for the direction of politics in the country.

Bangladesh, a country of 150-170 million people, about 90 percent of which are Muslims, should be at the front of your mind the next time you hear alarmist reports about 'Muslim extremism' on the rise across the Islamic world. What we are fed on a daily basis from places like Bangladesh, but also from the region at the center of our course, MENA, paints a picture very different from reality. We will discuss further the reasons for the success of Islamists in post-revolution elections in Tunisia and Egypt, but I can mention briefly here that the reasons we will find have very little to do with a religious 'mood' among the public, and much more to do with organizational capabilities and credibility following decades of secular authoritarianism.

The way our news media operates today, if we want to be informed about the world around us, we have to make an effort to go beyond the hegemonic media discourse and actively seek out information. If we rely on what is delivered to us by the major networks, we won't notice those who struggle for political and social justice, unless people are dying in the streets. And even then it depends on whether the 'story' fits whatever criteria news organizations use to determine what is 'newsworthy.' A non-revolutionary social movement, no matter how significant and historic, will for the most part pass by without notice - even when they manage to mobilize millions in the streets.