Turning Movements into Political Action

Hahrie Han's article from the Atlantic was quite thorough and precise in analyzing necessary prerequisites for the creation of successful social movements whilst it is possible to draw several links to our class discussions. I think the most important aspect is the coherence of demands when it comes to demonstrating. This was in my opinion the greatest weakness of the Women's March, where although there was great participation and a very emotional vibe throughout the march, there was also a serious lack of purpose. The speeches were very general and did not address particular elites which could in turn be influential. Relating this further to the US political scene, I believe that the two party system, seriously diminishes the possibility for the formation of successful social movements mostly because particular demands and initiatives to change specific policies are defused into a more general policy that includes opinions from a very broad spectrum. For example, demands expressed by Bernie Sanders and by many others throughout the years are being difused into a more general neoliberal policy within the Democratic Party. This is not two say that social movements cannot succeed without the support of political entities, however, some political elites have to take the burden in the case of successful political movements, and essentially execute the demands. In the case of the Democratic Party, it doesn't seem that there is anyone who at the moment is ready to adopt more divergent approaches and essentially facilitate more particular changes.

Social Media in 2011

Undoubtedly, the role of Social Media in the 2011 revolts was important. However, there is a particular limit to their effectiveness that is directly related to the capacity of the coercive apparatus in each country. The extent to which the press and the freedom of speech are oppressed are two key aspect in the formation of social movements and essentially revolts. In the case of Egypt, this was part of a process that had began from 2005 when the government made concessions and allowed the opening of privately owned newspapers. It was these newspapers that excised some form of criticism against the government from the very first time while exposing a variety of scandals and schemes. Besides this the lessening of measures when it came to public gatherings should also be taken into considerations. The importance of this is highlighted more in the present, where it is much harder to publicly demonstrate in the country. Most importantly, we should also have in mind the discontent across many different groups of people in Egypt, as shown in the documentary we watched in class. Young people felt hopeless and without a future, labour unionists felt exploited whilst the middle class disliked the corruption. It wasn't the social media that created the incentive for the creation of a social movement but it was the discontent of the people. This can be further exemplified through the example of Turkey. Freedom of speech has been harshly pressed in Turkey for decades. During the Gezi Park revolts the social media played a crucial role into mobilizing people, however, the government forces were proven to be way more powerful and eventually suppressed the demonstrations. At the moment social media are either blocked or regulated in Turkey, however there are still ongoing demonstrations as people find other means to communicate. In other words, social media are very important into facilitating social movements and mobilization because they make communication more interactive whilst they maximize access to information. However, even without social media, people could still mobilize because they feel discontent and even with social media, social movements can be crushed because of the robustness of the states' coercive apparatuses.

Israel Palestine Conflict

Overall, the coverage of the Israel Palestine Conflict has been quite problematic over the years. As on any other conflict and as it happens with most coverage of news, we tend to emphasizes on what makes us different rather than focusing on what unites us. The case of Palestinians in Gaza is a very complicated one, and conventional non violence measures would be hard to work, mostly because of their isolation and the lack of coverage. One of the most important points highlighted in Gene Sharp's reading was the power of the people as consumers and how embargo's could influence governments as it happened in the case of South Africa. In the context of Gaza this would be very hard to implement because Palestinians in the region are even more isolated and in many cases are deprived of many basic goods. Thus their position is very disadvantaged. However, many things could be done, if there was support from both Israelis and Israeli Palestinians. If all of them unite under the umbrella of civil society, the force would be significantly more powerful and effective. Most importantly, coverage of such events as well as coverage of aspects of the hardships are essential not only for the rest of the world to get informed but also for the Palestinians themselves to feel that people out there share and understand what they are going through. It could be argued that it is the very sense of helplessness that drives people towards violence and triggers equally violent responses. Besides this, it is essential to invest on conflict-resolution programs for the youth of both Israeli and Palestinian communities. Enhancing communication between the two would not only highlight the common interests they share with each other but it could also provide a framework for the potential formation of social movements which will seek change. 

Social Movements in MENA

In my opinion, at the moment the conditions are rather unfavorable for a social movement to develop in the MENA region. As said by others and as mentioned in Eva Belin's reading in regards to the power of the coercive apparatus, authoritarian regimes in the MENA region still have the capacity to maintain a coercive apparatus which can press any kind of opposition. Belin argues that as long s this coercive apparatus enjoys the support of foreign powers, especially the waste it will be able to sustain itself. My prediction is that in a period of political turmoil the West will seek to maintain stability in the region to secure its own interests. Authoritarian regimes claim that they are the only ones who can maintain this stability and for many policy makers in the West this seems to be the case. Therefore the West will choose stability, over democracy, and will maintain a coercive apparatus which will be able to suppress any kind of movements. 

Besides this, it could be argued that the formation of a social movement is even more unlikely in the Gulf region, mostly due to the system of the rentier state. Citizens enjoy a vast amount of benefits from the state and it is more likely that they would like to maintain a status quo like that rather than overthrowing it. Discontent is a necessary prerequisite for the desire of a social movement, or at least change. On the surface this doesn't seem to be the case in the Gulf region, however it is likely the it would be so in the future when oil reserves will decrease dramatically. In fact civil society in the Gulf is mostly working in favor of the status quo rather than against it. This is the case in other countries as well such as Turkey. Thus, this makes the possibility of a social movement even more unlikely.

Social movements are only as strong as the people within them. A successful social movement can not operate with low representation, even if every tactic is executed perfectly. If people don't show up, nothing will ever change. The two greatest barriers to achieving high levels of representation are fear of reprisals from the state and general apathy. To combat these, a social movement must be both inspiring and pragmatic. Inspiring in the sense that it must make people believe that showing up will actually make a difference and pragmatic in that it must capture that momentum into making real, tangible steps forward.

RE: Social Movements and Democratization

Social movements have been extremely important to the MENA region in terms of paving the way to democratic representation. There are also many different types of states within the MENA region, and of course each social movement is going to look very different in each state. I think that in order for a social movement to work, the state itself must allow for large amounts of people to organize easily. For example, a state that heavily censors social media, it may be harder for people to organize a large social movement. In turn, social movements may be small and perhaps ineffective. It is important to have a vast amount of representation in order for a social movement to be effective, and those people must be able to organize themselves in a way that sends a clear message to the government to go forward with legitimate social change. A possible challenge to the function of social movements is how exactly to unite these people. For example, the MENA region in general is lacking nationalism, so it is hard to unite the citizens just under the belief that they are all from nation. Instead, some social movements have united based off Islam, which is strong enough in the region to have a vast influence, bring people together, all while still having an impact on the government itself to move towards social change. This are the things that unite enough people to lead to a revolution.

Re: Non-violent Movements and the Israel-Palestine Conflict

I think that for many conflicts all over the world, violent action receives majority of attention in comparison to non-violent action. This could be just because of the nature of social media and news outlets wanting to garner attention by means of click-bait, promising shocking live footage, etc. While it is important that news outlets report on non-violent action, they realize that violent action attracts more viewers/listeners/readers. I also think that the kind of news reported is heavily dependant on the news station that is doing the reporting. Western news stations tend to only report Palestinian violence on Israel, but the news coming from Palestine will completely contrast in comparison, and will most likely focus on non-violent actions coming from Palestine. The overuse of clickbait and shocking headlines is creating a trend in media where only violent action seems worthy of reporting. Non-violent action is getting overshadowed by violent acts, thus going unnoticed.  As for what needs to happen for a peaceful future for Israel and Palestine, I think a focus on security might help. I do not really think Israel and Palestine will ever truly have a future together, but the future could possibly be peaceful is each country agrees to keep to themselves. Neither country trusts each other, and want to keep each other out of their land. Israel is very self aware of their security, but if surrounding Arab countries encourage Israel to compromise, but manage to maintain Israel’s security, there may be a possibility of a peaceful future between the two countries.

RE: Social Media

The role of social media played an important role during the Arab revolts of 2011, and is an important tool for just about any revolt in the twenty-first century. The use of Twitter and Facebook is an easy way to spread the message to a large audience all at once, and especially to a generation very involved in social media. Without social media, it is very plausible that the revolution would not have been as big as it was. Social media is an easy way to rally support and get large numbers to come to events such as protests. Social media, depending on the poster, can be a very honest and raw and show the public images and stories the news cannot. Especially in countries where the news is heavily censored, social media is an outlet to post whatever you want. Social media may not have been a necessary factor in order for the revolution to happen, but it certainly helped rally the support of the younger generation especially. The revolution most likely would have happened out of just desperation in Egypt, but without social media, organizing such protests would have been much more difficult and a lot smaller in numbers, potentially leading the revolts to fail.

The past week, your readings focused on Islamist movements in the region. In our current 'post-Arab Revolts' environment, why do you think Islamists in particular have yielded such successes at the ballot box, in both Tunisia and Egypt?

There are a few possible reasons why Islamist experience such success at the ballot box. Even amidst the changes toward secularization and modernization in the MENA region, Islamist movements still prove to be very popular in the region. This could be because the Islamist beliefs resonate with a large portion of the population in the region, mostly due to Islam being the dominate religion. Their ideas feel a lot more principle in comparison to “new,” democratic ideas, and voters may feel more comfortable voting for someone within the same religion. Another explanation for the success of Islamist movements is best shown by Egypt. In Egypt, the people experienced many failing regimes coming from the military. When an Islamist was up at the ballot box, the Egyptian public voted for them not just because of their religion, but because they were looking for a new change within their government. When politicians in Egypt began incorporating Shariah Law into their campaign, it was a fresh new look at the government the people had not seen in a long time, since before the 1952 revolution. Both Egypt and Tunisia both experienced unsuccessful military regimes for many years, so people look to Islam as a way to connect with their government, and as a way to for them to feel comfortable with the law deciding process.

RE: The Rise (and Fall?) of Political Islamism

I think that the political Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt had such great turnouts at the ballots are because Islam is one common connection most of the country has in common. Tunisia and Egypt are both majority Muslim countries. I also think that because most of the political Islamists are not in fact politicians or at least weren't, made the public feel better in their decision to make a religious Muslim be put in power.

Re: Social Movements and Democratization

Unfortunately, the Middle East has not had a rich history of Democracy and is only now reaching its wave of Democratization. I think the reason why democracy has not held in the Middle East is because it was mainly a western theory. Today the Social Movements have had little effect on actual steps to making the Middle East Democratic, due to the fact that these authorities have held onto power for such a long time and have so much power in the country that it would be almost impossible to make a new government without the country being destroyed from Civil War and having changed only after the death of thousands of people for reform. In many countries of the MENA region, ruling royal families are in power, such as in Morocco, Jordan, the Sheikhs that rule the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. These royal families have so much power in the country it would be extremely hard to take them out of power. I do not think that Democratization could hold in these MENA countries mainly due to the strict governments, anti- Western views and the fact that they are not European and Democracy does not always work.

RE:The Role of Social Media in the Arab Revolts

The use of social media was incredibly smart on the half of the young Arabs in Egypt, Tunisia, etc. who showed the world what they are protesting and what is happening to them. They knew a majority of our generation have Instagram, Twitter and Facebook, and they can share their stories, first hand accounts, photos and videos out to the world from the peoples view, not just the governments or the medias view, but from the actual people. Although the Egyptian government did find a way to silence the people by shutting off the 3G in the country and stopping the connection of news coming from the Egyptian youth out to the public. The role of Social Media played a crucial role in the mobilization of the youth in Egypt and Tunisia, but unfortunately it was not effective enough in Egypt because the protests of 2011 had little effect.

RE: Non-violent Movements and the Israel-Palestine Conflict

I think that a majority of the news coming out of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict is about the violence is because when lives are lost, the world pays more attention. Also due to the fact that it happens so often. In Israel on average there is a rocket attack once a month or during times of "peace" only once a month or a few times a month. Along with the rocket attacks, stone throwings, stabbing attacks and several other violent methods are used. I think that if the Palestinians decreased the number of violent methods used, and use methods such as sit ins and protests, it will make the Palestinian cause look more humane and less violent.

Re: The Rise (And Fall) of Political Islamists

I think political Islamists have obtained so many, specifically in Egypt, because they aren't tied to the political elites. In both Tunisia and Egypt we saw revolts against the elites and political Islamists were shown as an alternative to politicians. Religion played a role for some, but not all; I believe it was more the services provided by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood that encouraged people to vote for them. In Egypt after Morsi however, the population lost trust of political Islamists because they turned out to be just like the politicians. This I think indicates that the Egyptian people want some radical change almost; by this I mean change that will bring the reform they are looking for and a government that does look out for its' people. After the 2011 revolts, I think Egypt was stuck between caving into demands made by the people and keeping some of the power for the political elite.

Re: First Post

Referencing the Bellin reading, resistance to democracy in the MENA region is because the region lacks the perquisites that would allow countries to achieve democracy (Bellin 24). Some causes of the resistance include a weak civil society, low literary, low per capita income, and distance from the democratic epicenter (Bellin 2005: 24). Bellin explains the lack of uprisings that took place in Egypt and Tunisia prior to 2011 due to the “repression of civil society” and the will of the state to smash any uprisings (Bellin 2005:30). The fear of military suppression towards protesters may have also played a role in discouraging “democratic forces” (Bellin 2005:). Bellin would argue that the events in Egypt and Tunisia during 2011 transpired because the state lacked the will to put out the “democratic forces”. Since the heads of state in both countries rely heavily on the military and security to keep their power, the lack of intent to use military force would have made a vacuum where democratic forces could take back the power. All this would lead to the potential for a democracy to arise in a country. However, Egypt, unlike Tunisia, was unable to continue towards democracy which can be explained through dependency on the state for the people’s livelihoods and continued institutionalization of the government. I think it is fair to say that civil society in the region has been ineffective in trying to bring democracy. However, I think state influence on civil society has furthered the ineffectiveness of civil society in the region. State controlled economies, military and security, and patrimonialism all affect the way civil society operates and the state of civil society. Saying that civil society itself is weak in the region may be debatable, but the ineffectiveness of civil society in the region due to the specific state’s influence isn’t quite as debatable.

Re: Social Media

I think the role of social media has been exaggerated, but that doesn't mean we should ignore the role it played. Social media during the 2011 revolts was critical is rallying the masses and spreading information at the beginning of the social movement. Without the platform social media gave the demonstrators, I don't think it would have been as successful because social media allowed them to organize. After the leaders were able to mobilize, I think social media didn't play such a large role in continuing the movement. Social media was able to bring, not only Egyptians who live in Egypt, but also allow Egyptians abroad to add to the discussion and movement. The range of social media not only helped demonstrators to rally international support, but also helped their credibility in the international media. Today social media wouldn't have the same effect, but in 2011 it helped the revolts in a big way.

Re: The Role of Social Media in Arab Revolts

While Twitter and Facebook were essential to the revolutions of 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia, but their impact is often exaggerated. Social Media helped immensely with resource mobilization. For example, according to The Guardian, in Egypt a twelve page guide for resisting the regime was distributed by email, and demonstrations were arranged through Twitter and Facebook. Also, if people are considered resources, according to The Guardian, social media gave a voice to even the most marginalized groups in society and helped them participate in the rebellion. The rebels were also able to counter hegemonic discourse through social media by posting pictures of people killed at rallies that would not have been spread otherwise. The circulation of these images helped people to discredit the regime.  

However, at one point the movement had to function without social media, when the regime cut off all internet and 3G in the country after the forces of social media became too strong. This act exemplifies the regime's strong willingness to repress the rebellion. However, during this time, rebels communicated through hand held signs that displayed the times of demonstrations. Eventually their movement was successful. While social media did contribute immensely to the credibility and efficiency of the movement, the movement itself was able to function without the various social media platforms.

Re: Social Movements and Democratization

Lisa Anderson talks about two types of states. Strong states, which can accommodate and respond to popular demands, and weak states, which attempt to ignore and suppress such demands. She characterizes strong states as ones that are stable enough to have democratic qualities, and weak ones as the opposite. She also notes that weak states have ambiguous territorial borders. A social movement would be more likely to work in Anderson's definition of a strong state because the state is not as oppressive and likely guarantees freedom of speech. However, in a weak states, a social movement would not be likely to succeed because it would be forcefully repressed by the military. Additionally, according to Anderson, the existence patronage in these types of states would prevent movements from making any significant gains because of the large gap between the elite class and the poor class that patronage enables.

Re: The Rise (and Fall?) of Political Islam

In Egypt, Islam has yielded success in the ballot box because Egyptians wanted a change from the current military regime. Since, after the fall of Mubarak, the government has not met the people's demands, the people are turning to groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who have fought for representation in the government for decades and are very close to the culture of many Egyptians. In Tunisia, where the institution of democracy has been relatively successful since the fall of Ben Ali, the Islamist party there, Ennahda, is becoming more and more secular. Its commitment to democracy has helped it to maintain popularity among the people (Aljazeera).

Re: First Question

According to Bellin, MENA has been so resistant to democratic reform not because it lacks the elements traditionally thought to bring democracy, such as civil society and high literacy rates, but because the oppressive governments of the region remain willing to oppress rebellions. She points out that in regions where the oppressive governments lost power, such as Latin American, democracy began to take root. Therefore, she argues that since the oppressive governments of MENA, or coercive institutions as she calls them, haven't lost their willingness to oppress rebellion, MENA has not been able to democratize like Latin America.

She would say that what happened in Egypt validates her argument. In 2011, the movement to overthrow Mubarak succeeded in part because the military allowed the protesters to continue protesting, despite what Mubarak said. She would say that this was an example of the regime loosing its ability to repress the movement, which is what she believes leads to democracy. However, in Tunisia, the regime did not show signs of letting up until Ben Ali fled the country. Therefore, she might not be able to apply her argument to Tunisia in the same way, considering the strong civil society that existed in the face of a government did not display a willingness to stop oppressing.

I think it is somewhat accurate to say that civil society in MENA is a "weak and ineffective champion of democracy." The fact that democracy has not been achieved does not change the fact that there is evidence of strong civil society in places such as Egypt, where the Kefiya movement came together, bridging many different ideologies in order to create a group focused on toppling the regime. However, in most cases, democracy has not been instituted, so civil society may not be "weak," but technically it's not a "champion of democracy" either.

Re: Non-violent movements and the Israel-Palestine Conflict

As we have learned, attention quickly goes away from the purpose of a movement when violence comes into the picture, which is likely because it is “a bigger story.” Like many other situations that have violent and nonviolent sides, it is a more “interesting” news story to cover a violent situation than it is to cover a non-violent story. Which is awful, but our media is looking to cover things which will get more views and start more conversations among us.

In order for there to be a peaceful future in Israel and Palestine, nonviolent practices should be implemented such as boycotts, marches, sit-ins, etc.

RE: The Role of Social Movements in the Arab Revolts

Like many have probably said, social media become a major/important tool when it comes to forming and spreading the messages of social movements over the past few years. Social media for people has become a platform to communicate and express their emotions frustrations of what has been going on in their country, and a lot of times have evidence to back their frustration up. Social media is in many scenerios in MENA states the only way they can excercise their free speech. Social media outlets are just a platform that accompanies the social movements, it is just a tool not the sole "game changer" that role lies in the people and the way they set up such social mobilizations. In the Arab revolts of 2011 Axford brought up the point in his "Talk about a Revolution: Social Media and the MENA Uprisings" that social media was in some cases that social media was not as "free" as people not living in the world of MENA might think.  It is important to note that in most cases the government has full control in what citizens are allowed and prohibited since they have control of the state's internent serves. If they see something that they don't like, they can easily remove it or block that outlet completely. Hence though this idea of "free speech" has limitations that the people have to work around to get their movements out to their targetted arudience.  For example, in Tunisia bloggers among others who used their platform to promote social mocements were imprisonsed among other sorts of punishment. 

I believe that the Arab revolts of 2011 would most likely not have been as successful as it was without the use of social media. I believe that a lot of people living in Western countries would have not understood the severity of what the people of the states in MENA are going through without the videos among other things posted on social media.  

RE: The Rise (and Fall) of Political Islamist

A major reason why certain Islamist revolts have yielded such successes is because of the unity of the communities. For example, the united frustration and oppression that they felt let them create outlets and groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Such groups were able to create the conversations and a support system to help the people of the state. When the people of the state are finally fed up of being mistreated the separation between becomes greater and the need for a regime grows stronger. Hence there is becomes more strength and support in the Islamist movements the trust grows more, there is a sense of understanding that people in the state will never understand because its citizens helping citizens in most cases. For example, in Tunisia and Egypt, the important of reclaiming their rights through such things as their faith/religion and through the youth was helped many persevere. The messages that were in embedded in such movements bring motivation and comfort for them and the more the message is spread the more support and the strength in numbers is a major part of helping a regime become successful. 

RE: Social Movements and Democratization

For some individuals, social movements to be successful it needs to consist “sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that advertise the claim, based on activities” (Tilly & Tarrow 216). On the other hands of things, author Joel Benin and Marie dub believe otherwise. The idea of social movements and the way it will succeed in the eyes of Benin must include the aspect of the "combination of an authoritarian state and . . . people who do not conceive of themselves as or aspire to be fully autonomous individuals detached from dense networks of families and friends" In any case the in order for a nation to be successful a widespread understanding and agreement within the society. In Tunisia for example it states that it “was held up as a positive example of modernisation in the MENA region and its civil society was considered far more vibrant than in neighboring states (Hardig 36). Tunisia became what it is today when it came to social movement right after his independence, “Tunisia has historical precedence for state organisation and as active civil society role before independence, the state was never fully in control of the civil society space — trade unions, while operating in corporate model as in Egypt, were much more autonomous from the state” (Hardig 37). If there is not any sort of established unified society, they will most likely be unable to successfully transition into a democracy.

RE: First Post

As many of the previous blog posts have stated the main reason that the region of MENA has a resistance to democracy has a lot to do with being uninformed about the main goal of democracy. Because the people of the region do not have the necessary knowledge and understanding on how to built an effective democracy that can withstand hardship, there is this “resistance” to it. The main causes for such resistance include first and foremost the status of the civil society which usually results from the lack of communication with their government. Specifically for Egypt and Tunisia Bellin presented the idea of “repression of civil society” as well the idea of the power the state has to erase whatever other groups or organizations presenting itself in a way that might threaten the government's place. And because of how isolated region there is always a sense of dependency that the civilization has on the government. The state controls everything that happens and most of the information given to the public because of that I truly believe that is where the lack of progress comes from. The state is too busy solidifying their control and making sure that the society stays weak is why individuals perceive the region as a weak state. It’s not that they necessarily are, it’s because the society really has no space to move forward and break away from their dependency.

Re: The Rise (and Fall?) of Political Islamism

Islamists have yielded success in Egypt and Tunisia because voters want to elect representatives that resemble their own beliefs and are able to empower the people away from oppression. Voters want an organization and a political structure that is able to stand the test of time and resist its opponents and oppressors. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood has been able to organize itself and communicate values and beliefs of its followers since 1928 despite Egyptian government opposition. The Brotherhood's strategic separation from the Egyptian regime and condemnation of its actions allowed it to amass half of the parliamentary seats in the 2011-2012 election (The Guardian). Meanwhile, Ennahda in Tunisia promised further democratic progression for the country and its future. Albeit strong pushback from the secular community, the party's appeals to Tunisian fears allowed it to become the most popular political party, gathering 29% of the popular vote.

Re: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Revolts

The advent of social media has proven to be crucial in the spread of ideas, information, and quite literally, movements. Social media acts as a virtual communal gathering space and provides easy access to direct messaging and the sharing of media, such as photos or videos of a specific event. During the evacuation of Aleppo, survivors desperately posted videos to Facebook and Twitter, telling their friends, families, and anyone who would listen goodbye. Fearful that they would not be alive by the time the video reached their loved ones, this act placed the dismal situation in Aleppo into perspective on a global stage.

The use of social media in the Arab Spring was crucial in effective planning for demonstrations and protests. As mentioned in Khondker's Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring, "we use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world" (Global Voice Advocacy, 2010). Without the integral role that each site played, protests and demonstrations may not have gathered the same support and showing of people. Sending a tweet or a direct message is faster, discrete, and more efficient than door-to-door campaigning and hanging posters. While it is an over-statement to say that social media was a defining factor in the revolts, we cannot understate their effectiveness.

Re: Social Movements and Democratization

According to Tilly and Tarrow, a social movement consists of "a sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that advertise the claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities" (206). However, in the case of the Egyptian Workers' Movement, Joel Beinin and Marie Duboc believe this definition should be altered to encompass the "combination of an authoritarian state and . . . people who do not conceive of themselves as or aspire to be fully autonomous individuals detached from dense networks of families and friends" (206). This particular movement was not focused under one organizer or party, rather the collective action of different localized movements. As noted, "these grievances were a response to the ongoing restructuring of the political economy affecting workers throughout Egypt" (207). For example, President Anwar al-Sadat's 1974 economic policy allowing for the privatization of public sectors disenfranchised thousands of Egyptian workers as "managers of public sector firms slated for privatization typically made them more attractive to buyers by reducing the workforce before the sale" (211). 2004 saw a second round of privatization under Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif, totaling $5.34 billion (211). Collective action in response to privatization erupted in worker strikes at the Misir Spinning and Weaving Company after governmental promises regarding a salary increase were not met. The workers organized a 4-day strike which ended with an awarded bonus and "assurances that the company would not be privatized" (218). This strike sparked strikes across the country and the government conceded in nearly all cases. 

The prevalence of civil society within a nation is crucial to successful social movements. For example, before the Arab Spring, “Tunisia was held up as a positive example of ‘modernisation’ in the MENA region and its civil society was considered far more vibrant than in neighbouring states” (Härdig 36). While anti-colonial movements of the 1950s began to shift public opinion of the status quo in colonial society, postcolonial governmental relations within Tunisia began to turn Tunisia into an authoritarian society even after its independence. However, “because Tunisia had a historical precedence for state organisation and an active civil society role before independence, the state was never fully in control of the civil society space – trade unions, while operating in a corporate model as in Egypt, were much more autonomous from the state” (Härdig 37). Without the establishment of a cohesive civil society, MENA nations are unable to attain democratic participation.

Re: Non-violent Movements and the Israel-Palestine Conflict

In the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and possible other non-violent action across the globe, I believe these movements do not garner the same attention as violent-action due to its lack of appeal to viewers. While my perspective may be a mundane and rather blunt point of view, television networks, magazine and newspaper, and clickbait headlines are in the business of attracting viewers and advertisements. For example, in Washington D.C., peaceful protests parading throughout the city immediately after the inauguration (excluding the Women's March) did not gather nearly as much media coverage compared to their violent counterparts that rioted throughout the evening. 

In the Israel-Palestine conflict, violence in the media has overshadowed non-violence for decades. During the 1947-49 exodus of Palestine, otherwise known as Nakba, violence and death dominated global news headlines while growing non-violent action was virtually ignored. Western media portrays Palestinians as violent terrorists claiming to reclaim their homes through means of violence. However, this is the only way Palestinians are able to convey their message due to virtual media silence in response to their non-violent action. Young Palestinians have grown accustomed to violent action gathering media coverage, creating a vicious cycle that increasingly diminishes the viability of non-violent action. In order for the conflict to ever reach a peaceful outcome, Western media must portray non-violent action as the path to success. Media ignorance of non violence only serves to feed this detrimental cycle.

Re: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Revolts

Social media played an incredibly important role in the Arab Revolts of 2011 because it gave people a platform to share stories, post videos, plan events, and spread news with millions of people at a time and for free.  It essentially gave a voice to the voiceless, because along with the invention of smartphones, social media allowed people to film acts of violence and post them on their accounts, or create groups on Facebook in which they could invite thousands to participate in demonstrations.  It opened up an array of horizons and allowed people from different communities and even different countries to communicate with one another and spread ideas.  

Social media wasn’t necessary for the demonstrations to happen, given the fact that revolution had been occurring for centuries before this invention, however, it did render rebellion easier and more accessible to the general public.  Without Facebook and Twitter as tools, these revolts perhaps would have taken a few more years or even decades to occur.  The anger and frustration with the government was always present, but it was social media that allowed people to publicly voice their opinions and convince other to join in on the demonstrations.  It put pressure on autocratic governments because it was suddenly much harder to hide human right abuses, and it also allowed for political activists, civil society and NGOs around to world to get a glimpse of life in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia and help foster movements that would seek to overthrow tyrannical leaders.

Re: Non-Violent Movements and the Israel-Palestine Conflict

I think one of the reasons (and perhaps the main one) for which non-violent action does not seem to gain the same attention and even response as violent action is the sheer nature of the conflict.  The Israeli military consistently uses violence against the Palestinians, and is so adept at overpowering any sort of rebellion that the Palestinians have no choice but to resort to violent means.  The tactics used in the Civil Rights Movement or under the British Occupation of India can not be replicated in this scenario because of the structure of the conflict.  

Armed resistance groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Fatah are the only forms of defense Palestinians can use to fight back against oppression.  Moreover, the reason nonviolent does not get as much attention is perhaps because the narrative of the conflict portrays Palestinians as violent and terrorists and Israelis as victims and simply wanting to defend their home.  The irony is that the reality is quite the contrary.  In this particular instance,  I don't necessarily disagree with the use of violent means, simply because it seems P,estonians have two options: two fight or to surrender.  They are lacking in basic needs such as food, water and medical care, so they do not have the luxury of boycotting or protesting.  They do not have the means or resources to fight back without force, which is why the conflict has turned to violent.  

Turning movement into political action

This article in the Atlantic is not MENA related, but it is directly related to our discussions on when social movements succeed:

How a Scientist Who Studies Marches Sees the March for Science

Re: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Revolts

Social media has been becoming increasingly important for social movement formation over the last decade as it serves as a platform for civilians to voice their opinions. Although it is increasing in importance, it is not a sole driving factor for the social mobilization of the Arab revolts of 2011. Yes, blogs, facebook, twitter, and the like are helpful in assisting organization, advocation, and informing citizens when there is not open/free media otherwise. However, as Axford discusses, social media was not protected against the government, so it wasn’t always free and open either. Because governments have control over their internet servers they had the ability to track posters and even shut the internet down if they wanted to. Axford states that in Tunisia, anti-regime bloggers were imprisoned and tortured. Facebook, which is commonly thought of as a platform that is used by those trying to mobilize social movement, was not free either. The government would frequently attempt to make fake pages to identify others who were anti the regime. The response of the Tunisian government is not unusual, and takes the power of social media away from the people.

I think that the Arab revolts of 2011 may have been more difficult to mobilize without social media, although I do not think that they would have been impossible. Facebook and Twitter make it easier for citizens to get information out to others, and to organize protests and such, and to share stories from those protests. In terms of the initial mobilization and then keeping that momentum going, social media was a relatively necessary factor in the Arab revolts of 2011, although after that, I think that Facebook and Twitter just became places where the government could capture revoltes.

The Role of Social Media in the Arab Revolts

Much has been written about the Arab revolts of 2011 and one of the central themes has been the potential role of social media. Mainstream media, ever desperate to 'get with the youth,' has been especially active in inventing catchy labels, such as the "Twitter Revolution" or "Facebook Revolution." For this week's structured response, I want you to think critically about this supposed importance of social media in the 2011 revolts. Using what you know about social movement formation, what would have been different without social media? Was social media a necessary factor for the revolutions to happen, or would they have happened regardless of Twitter and Facebook?

Non-violent Movements and the Israel-Palestine Conflict

As you may have already known, non-violent action in the Israel-Palestine conflict does not get even a fraction of the attention violent action does. Why do you think that is? In light of the readings, what do you think needs to happen for a peaceful future in Israel and Palestine?

Re: Social Movements and Democratization

There are two major parts to conducting a strong social movement.  The first is to have a common purpose or goal amongst participants.  That is to say, as we briefly mentioned in class a few weeks ago, an example of a failed attempt at a social movement was the Occupy Movement.  The major criticism we made of the movement was that the protesters had no common goal.  They essentially were each fighting for something different.  The same goes for the Women's March a couple months ago.  Although it was well-intended, what ended happening was that men and women from an array of backgrounds and perspectives were all marching together and shouting or holding up posters which stood for varying, and in some casing contrasting ideas.  

This important step also applies to social movements in MENA.  Citizens of many countries poured into the streets and began protesting for things like democracy, governmental reform, economic reform, etc., which are all clear and evident goals, which is why many were successful in overthrowing their leaders.  The issue in many countries, however, was that once these leaders were overthrown, the next step was not evident.  That is when civil society comes into play.  It is important that citizens have a clear image of what to set out for, otherwise they will be unsuccessful.  The main challenge is that many of these societies do not have a strong civil society to begin with, and people fear the idea of going into the streets and speaking their minds because their freedom of speech and assembly is not protected.  It is therefore very difficult to convince large numbers of people to make such large sacrifices and risk their lives in the name of progress and democracy. 

Re: The Rise (and Fall?) of Political Islamism

Islamists have yielded success in Egypt in recent years because the country has undergone an extensive social revolution.  Although Egypt has never really been a full-fledged liberal democracy, it has had a history of a relatively progressive society, beginning most notably with Gamal Abdel Nasser.  He was a strong advocate of secularism, modernization and uniting Egyptians around Arab values rather than Muslim values.  Although perhaps not as direct and obvious with his vision for Egypt, Mubarak, who came to power many years later as a critic of strict Islamic ideals.  

When he was deposed, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood went from being a prohibited but well-organized group relatively on sidelines to what is essentially now a political party on the forefront of Egyptian politics. This group has effectively instigated a “social revolution” among Egyptian people by convincing them of the need to revert back to a time of strong Muslim values.  Their platform, although very diverse and constantly changing over time, maintains the need for a strong and evident role of Islam in Egyptian society and government.   It is highly disputed whether their history of violent acts should deem them a terrorist organization or whether their work bringing schools and hospitals (similar to Hezbollah) renders them a social movement which has swept over many countries in the Middle East.  I would argue the latter is what many Egyptians believe, which is why they effectively support them by turning out to vote. 

Re: Social Movements and Democratization

             It seems from the readings we have had that social movements tend to work in countries where there is an opening for civil society to have an influence socially, economically, and politically. Social movements work when they encourage participation and allow for sustained participation by all citizens (Ibrahim 29). However, social movements fail to work when there is not already a strong presence of civil society and when the government oppresses civil society actors. In addition, social movements lack influence when there is no unity and is also dependent on the influence of foreign actors. Another failure of social movements is the use of identity politics and the ideas Islamism and secularism cannot exist.

              In Tunisia, social movements worked through a joint effort by the government and citizens to rewrite the constitution. Civil society took control of the political vacuum and insisted on change the population wanted. There were also numerous organizations unaffiliated with the government which increased the influence of civil society and gave the social movement credibility. Specifically, in Tunisia democracy was achieved and has continued to succeed, this can be attributed to the unity of the population to obtain a similar goal. Likewise, there was little state control of civil society which allowed civil society to thrive. Unlike Tunisia, after achieving the primary goal Egyptians were unable to achieve democracy through social movements because the interim government oppressed parts of civil society. An obstacle civil society still needs to overcome in Egypt is the authoritarian government. This includes the governments control over media to influence discourse, the oppressive policies in place under the guise of security, and using civil society to give the government their legitimacy (Hardig 40).

              Revolutionary movements are different than non-revolutionary movements in the sense that revolutionary movements are automatically working against the government using any means possible. Non-revolutionary movements are not inherently against the government, instead they may work with or against the antagonist to achieve their goal. In Libya for example the violence of the civil war overshadowed the efforts made by civil society to be part of the change. In this way, a revolutionary movement can ignore the civil society actors that are not protected by a legal system, or where rule of law doesn’t function (Hardig 39). Non-revolutionary movements do have to respect the accepted legal system and civil society.  Revolutionary movements, unlike non-revolutionary movements, can completely change the system in which they are operating. 

Social Movements and Democratization

You have thus far in this class learned about the potential of social movements as an avenue of democratic representation and about the state in the MENA region. I want you to try to make a link between these two issues - how might social movements work/not work in the different types of states you find across the region? In other words, what opportunities and/or challenges do you see to social movements  functioning as an avenue of democratic participation in the region? And how do you think these opportunities/challenges differ between revolutionary and non-revolutionary movements?

The Rise (and Fall?) of Political Islamism

The past week, your readings focused on Islamist movements in the region. In our current 'post-Arab Revolts' environment, why do you think Islamists in particular have yielded such successes at the ballot box, in both Tunisia and Egypt?

Spring Semester 2017 - first post

All - we're off to a late start on the blog, but here are the first questions! Normally, these questions will be posted on material that will be covered in the following class, but today's questions relate to today's class on confronting coercive institutions (Feb. 17 class) 

Why has the MENA region been so resistant to democratic reform? In light of the Arab Revolts of 2011, what do you think of Bellin's argument? How would she explain what happened in Tunisia and Egypt?

Also, is it accurate to say, as some do, that the region's civil society is "weak and... an ineffective champion of democracy" (Bellin 2005: 22)?