A simplified take: Tunisian Women and the Redrafting of the Constitution

            There is no doubt that Habib Bourguiba, a French-trained lawyer, set a precedent across the Arab world when he came to power in 1956 as the first prime minister of Tunisia (The Economist). Ostensibly, his choice to follow suit of Tahar Haddad's determination and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's vision, Bourgaiba was working with what they left behind (Fahem). Aside from the fact that the liberalization of Tunisia from French colonial and Ottoman monarchy rule was imminent at the time, his direct address and attention to liberalize and, what some might say controversial, take to radically distort social norms, those especially concerned with woman's rights, through tropes of governmental trickle-down nature was astounding.

            Through the teachings of this course, I will further delve into the nature of the role of Tunisian civil society, specifically focusing on the aftermath of the Tunisian Revolution for women's rights in Tunisia for length and clarity. I seek to better understand what the current position of Tunisian women is in the remaking of the Tunisian constitution.

            Since the Tunisian Revolution took place in 2011, the drastic changes that Tunisia has made regarding women's rights, in comparison to its neighbors, are to be noted. Remarkably, the commencement of drafting the new Tunisian Constitution in February 2012, in which women's rights and autonomy are central. On the global scale, the proposition to withdrawing its specific reservations regarding the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Daniele). Taking down all its preservations against the CEDAW law, such as the right of women to pass their nationality to their children, and equality in marriage and family life (qtd. in Daniele). While such advances denote a form of change in the way women's rights are regarded, a closer look the history of women's civil activism is due to better understand the role of Tunisian civil society.

            What is noteworthy when understanding Tunisian women's activism in historical contexts, it is distinctly limited to Bourguiba's adaptation of the workings of Tahar Haddad's political and social thought and the reworking of Ataturk's abolition of shari'a law and choosing to reform through permissible Islamic reinterpretation, known as ijtihad (Wing et. al). What it signifies is that current understandings of women's rights activism can be examined only after Tunisia's independence in 1956 and the adoption of the Code of Personal Status (CPS) (Wing et. al), which at its core focuses on reforms related to women and family law (Daniele). But what does that signify in better understanding the current position of Tunisian women in post-revolution Tunisia?

            The Code of Personal Status (CPS) is central to understanding the development of women's role in the remaking of the constitution, especially it being the stepping stone on which Tunisian women have been able to develop their strength in gaining momentum in their social activism. What is significant to bring to light here is that Tunisian women have made major advances in part because male-dominated patrilineages that emphasize traditional communitarian norms no longer hold sway, and there has been more emphasis on individual rights norms that benefit women's status (qtd. Wing et. al).  In effect, what this stands for is that the place of Tunisian women, in comparison to their Moroccan and Algerian counterparts, is distinctly different and is spearheaded in this respect (Wing et. al). Therefore, Tunisian women's role is one and the same as their male counterparts when participating in the changes that continue to take place since the nationwide mobilization. Yet, how would such a position be translated and the remaking of the constitution?

            The role and influence that Islamist secular movements have had since the ousting of Ben Ali are undeniably evident. From the considerable debate between Islamic political groups, represented by the Nahda Islamic Party (al-Nahda), and secular movements, represented by the Congress Party for the Republic and the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties, known as Ettakatol, during the process of drafting the new Tunisian Constitution in 2012 (Sadek). To the pronounced opposition by secular parties and civil society groups pushing back against a proposed provision to the Penal Code criminalizing blasphemy, as well as the increased Islamic political factions insisting that constitutional provisions and domestic legislation related to women adhere to what they view as Islamic law in the new constitution (Sadek). Despite the unmistakably pronounced Islamist stronghold in the Constituent Assembly, the revolution provided a critical opportunity to replace old hegemonic framework for women's rights with a new bottom-up model based on popular discourse and civil-society-led initiatives (de Silva de Alwis et al.). There is no doubt that the revolutionary outset and in relation to women's institutional representation in the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) has been used as a political tool used mainly to convince people of the closeness of political parties to gendered issues by often instrumenting the role of women (de Silva de Alwis et al.). This particular aspect has been only used when the ousted Ben Ali sought global political support, and at the outset of the Revolution, the discourse had completely shifted; and in turn prompted an increased participation in the debate on gender issues in which Tunisian women, both Islamist and secular, have occupied crucial positions (de Silva de Alwis et al.). What is significant to mention here is that women were well represented in most NCA decision-making bodies, as well as their omnipresence in the six constituent committees in charge of drafting provisions under specific constitutional themes, with the Committee on Human Rights and Liberties, which was responsible for most issues related to women's rights being headed by a woman (de Silva de Alwis et al.).

            While the aforementioned points and references barely touch on the tip of the iceberg, what do they signify in terms of better understanding the current position of Tunisian women is in the remaking of the Tunisian constitution through the teachings of this course? There is no doubt that the strength of Tunisian civil society stems from its ability to organize and lead change, to rallying support from a bottom-up standpoint where Tunisian youth have been fronting mobilization on all aspects of the revolution (El Fani). From the numerous workshops held by national NGOs for young people from all over Tunisia to meet and network, to their direct engagement in expressing their concern about the redrafting of the Tunisian constitution, civil society organizations have frequently made their presence and mobilization strength accounted for (de Silva de Alwis et. al).  What can be evidently deduced is that a constitutional centric culture that has room to house women's participation, in an unprecedented manner, in the redrafting of the new constitution is one that is civically engaged and has historically undergone through ideological transition that permits the active political participation of women in an ever more turbulent and changing discourse.

           

             

           

References

The Economist. “Habib Bourguiba”. 2000. https://www.economist.com/node/303168

Fahem, Amel. “Women of Tunisia”. December 2010.          https://womenoftunisia.weebly.com/index.html

Daniele, Giulia. “Tunisian Women’s Activism after the January 14 Revolution: Looking within   and towards the Other Side of the Mediterranean.” Journal of International Women’s Studies, Vol. 15, no. 2, July 2014, pp. 16-32. http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol15/iss2/2/

Wing, Adrien Katherine and Hisham Kassim. The Future of Palestinian Women's Rights:            Lessons from a Half-Century of Tunisian Progress. Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 64, no. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 1551- 1568. ProQuest Central.             https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol64/iss4/13

de Silva de Alwis, Rangita, Mnasri, Anware and Estee Ward. "Women and the Making of the      Tunisian Constitution." Faculty Scholarship. Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, vol.   35, no.1, 2017, pp. 90-148. http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1756.

Sadek, George. “The Role of Islamic Law in Tunisia’s Constitution and Legislation Post-Arab     Spring.” Library of Congress. 2013. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/tunisia.php

El Fani, Nadia. Neither Allah Nor Master. Documentary.  https://www.idfa.nl/en/film/c10f5db1-c2a8-4283-a96a-1f12f13e8595/neither-allah-nor-master/docs-for-sale.

Saudi Arabia 2011-2012 Protest Movements

Saudi Arabia has often been criticized for the legislation and action it takes towards its citizens. Although the Arab Spring was not as prominent or problematic in Saudi Arabia it did have a domino effect. A movement that took place in 2011, 2012, and is still occurring in Saudi Arabia, was in response to the Saudi governments discriminatory actions towards the Shia population in the country. The protests were organized by Faisal Ahmed Abdul-Ahad through Facebook. He organized protests to be led on March 11^th, that were named ‘Day of Rage.’ The basis of the protests were human rights, the people were unhappy with regime and wanted a change. Many people were angered by the actions taken by the government towards Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr. Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr was arrested on no legitimate basis. During his time in jail, he was tortured mercilessly, and was later executed in the 2016 mass execution. The execution of Sheikh Nimr Al- Nimr sparked outrage in all communities within Saudi Arabia.  

The protests took place in front of government buildings in the cities of Riyadh, Ta’if, and Tabuk. People were trying to arrange for the release of prisoners that were being held without probable cause or any valid charge. Organizers of the protesters were trying to argue for the release of prisoners irrespective of their sect, shia and sunni. While there were a lot of protests and even international calls for the release of illegally detained prisoners, it had no effect on the House of Saud.

The protests were not limited to only anti-shia sentiments, the protests that continued in the spring of 2011, May specifically, were also to call for the Peninsula Shield Force, the military of the GCC, to be taken out of Bahrain. During the protests, many protestors were shot dead by Saudi forces for partaking in anti-government protests. With the death toll of protesters rising, more and more protests would pop up. The government issued laws that made protesting illegal and any speech that opposes the government against the law.

In the course of the protests, the movement #Women2Drive also began, recently Prince Khalid bin Salman announced that although guardianship laws will still be in effect, women will be granted the right to drive alone. The movement began when Manal al- Sharif and other Saudi women organized a campaign. Sharif was the first woman arrested as a part of the movement. Following her example, many other women drove cars and some were even sentenced to lashes. These women started the movement that is now liberating women and although there are many restrictions that come with the right to drive, it is a step in the right direction.

Saudi Arabia’s armed forces were quite involved in the protests that took place, fatalities occurred on both sides. One of the reasons why the movements that took place in Saudi Arabia were not successful is because they were not supported by the army. The army plays a central role when it comes to successful movements. The people were not able to get public officers, such as the army or police on their side. Another reason why the movement was not successful is because there is so much media censorship that many of the injustices that were occurring were not known to the international community. While social media was a big part of the movement especially when it came to Sheikh Nimr Al Nimr and his execution. There were protests in retaliation to his execution throughout the Western world, it became one of the worst human rights atrocities committed by the Saudi Arabian government.

The protests that took place during the Arab Spring within Saudi Arabia, were a result of political and economic unrest that the people of Saudi Arabia were tired of dealing with. From anti-shia sentiments, to wrongful imprisonment, and women’s rights a movement of change began during this time. Many issues came to the forefront because people thought that there is a chance for change throughout the Arab world. Although the movements did not bring immediate change to the country and caused many problems as well as deaths, they set the ball in motion for many changes that are occurring in the country today. No movements are successful overnight, and Saudi Arabia is definitely not an exception. Since Saudi Arabia is a more conservative country and a strict follower of Sharia law, change does not occur easily. However, the government is enacting changes slowly so that people are easily accustomed to the change.

Work Cited

https://www.jstor.org/stable/23361621?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-executions-the-political-protesters-who-were-killed-and-those-still-on-death-row-a6795016.html

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/saudi-arabia

The Jasmine Revolution

A name promising both freedom of expression and democracy, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution sought to fight the oppressive socioeconomic rule of then President Sine El Abedine Ben Ali. Though it is most likely much higher than reported, Tunisia has an unemployment rate of 14 percent and many college graduates are without work (Hanley). Resulting from this, some Tunisians resort to alternative ways to support themselves and their families. This was the case for Mohamed Bouazizi. Unable to find a job after graduating from university, he bought a cart to sell produce on the street despite not having the money to obtain a permit to do so. Within the first day police confiscated the cart and proceeded to beat him. On December 17, 2010, as a display of protest, Bouazizi stood in front of his local governor’s home, doused himself in gas, and lit himself on fire. This initial action, executed by one individual, set in motion what would become the Jasmine Revolution.

            As seen in numerous modern-era social movements, social media heavily contributed to the rising popularity of the movement. Following Bouazizi’s suicide, his mother protested at the same site, where she was filmed doing so. This was uploaded to Facebook and broadcasted on the news network Al Jazeera (El-Khawas). It was a matter of days before an eruption of street protests. By Christmas, thousands of unarmed citizens were protesting across the country (Hanley). President Ben Ali responded by threatening protestors. Law enforcement officials, as promised, met the protestors with “tear gas, live ammunition and clubs” (Hanley). From this the protests turned violent, with some attempting to burn police cars as well as buildings. The protests continued and eventually made their way into Tunisia’s capital, Tunis. Ben Ali again threatened protests, along with stating that the protests against the poor economy and lack of jobs would actually have a negative effect on the economy (El-Khawas). The government became a target; on January 2, 2011 multiple government websites were hacked. The next few days saw a strike among almost all of Tunisia’s lawyers. This strike was a general protest demanding an end to police brutality against protestors. Teachers also joined the lawyer’s strike. By January 7, bloggers, reporters, activists, and even singers were being arrested by local security forces for speaking out against the regime. The working-class in the capital of Tunis was next to participate in the movement, beginning on January 11. Their violent protests were met with both ammunition and tear gas, but police still “failed to disperse the crowd” (El-Khawas). Facebook and Twitter, among other social media outlets, were continuously used to share the brutal actions of the Tunisian government against their people as they protested.

            Seeing no other solution to the violence, President Ben Ali announced on January 13 that he would not be running for reelection in 2014. In the meantime, he promised expanded freedoms, reforms, and an investigation into “the killings of protestors” (El-Khawas). This attempt to quell protestors was unsuccessful, however. Demonstrations continued into the next day. Ben Ali was advised on January 14, 2011 to flee the country, after his imposed state of emergency proved to be no more effective than any of his other attempts at resolution. He ended up in Saudi Arabia after being denied refuge in both Malta and France (Hanley). Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannaouchi became interim president and began forming a new coalition government. With so many of Ben Ali gone, protests turned to celebration. Unemployment and oppression being the basis for the revolution, driving out the president seemed to be the solution. One person was able to start the Jasmine Revolution alone. Seemingly the spark for Middle Eastern protests in the years to come, a successful regime change resulting from protesting the governing rule showed many that this sort of change is possible. Then United States President Barak Obama acknowledged the “courage and dignity of the Tunisian people” (Hanley). Within four weeks, Tunisian citizens were able to overthrow the government that has been oppressing them for decades.