Understanding the Arab Revolts

In our last class, you explored the macro, meso, and micro level factors that caused and/or facilitated the Arab Revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. As you know, these three cases had some common variables, but also differed in key variables (particularly the Libyan case, where the outcome was a civil war with NATO involvement, rather than a non-violent social movement). Key macro level variables, such as high youth unemployment/underemployment, were certainly not limited to the three countries we discussed yesterday, so clearly something else had to be introduced for a popular uprising to succeed.

On the micro level, the existence of civil society networks and informal structures of mobilization may have been crucial in facilitating the rise of a sustainable social movement in Tunisia and Egypt (again, Libya was different), but where do you think we find the key to the success/failure of a movement? Which variables must combine in order for a successful revolutionary social movement to take place? Use examples from other MENA countries, where mobilizations were not as successful as in Tunisia and Egypt.

Non-Violent Social Movements: The Intifada

Despite the current deterioration of the situation in the region, the First Intifada was able to achieve three things that have changed the nature of the conflict ever since. For one, the Intifada brought the violence and poverty amidst which most Palestinians live to the attention of a previously oblivious international community. Scenes of Israeli tanks and soldiers shooting unarmed women and children did much to weaken the previous 'invincibility' of the Israeli narrative of fighting terrorism. The conflict showed the brutality that both sides were capable of and showed the rest of the world the dire geo-political consequences of letting the conflict spin out of control. The Intifada also achieved the first major internationally-brokered dialogue between the warring sides, leading to the Madrid Conference and culminating in the Oslo Accords. These diplomatic successes are of particular note for they are the first time that both sides recognized each other and officially committed to the two-state solution. Finally, the Intifada led to the end of the meddling of other Arab states in Palestinian affairs. The severing of Jordanian financial and military ties at the end of the conflict allowed the PLO to become the sole representative of the Palestinian people.Thus, for the first time since 1947 the Palestinians were finally able to represent themselves and their own interests. 

The First Intifada had severe effects on both Palestinian and Israeli society. Palestinians were shown that unity and cooperation were extremely difficult, but the results of such a movement were relatively successful in the grand scheme of things. However, as a result of extensive subversion conducted by the Israeli military, a broad sense of mistrust and disunity characterized Palestinian society by the end of the conflict. On the Israeli side, the societal consequences were even more profound. The shattering of the image of Israel as righteous and fair in its actions along with the complete failure of the "Iron Fist" policy shook national self-confidence to its core. A large portion of Israelis began to openly question the government's response and this led to the severe weakening of the Rabin government. The most serious point to note is that for the first time, and irrevocably, through the brutal images broadcast around the world, the international community began to question the policies of the Israeli state. Thus, the Intifada brought the strife of the Palestinian people into the living rooms of the West, changing perceptions of the conflict forever, 

Use of Art in Non-Violent Protest in Palestine

Something I have found really interesting for a while is the use of rap and other art forms in Palestinian non-violent resistance. I found out about Shadia Mansour, called the "first lady of Arabic hip-hop", who is a Palestinian artist living in Britain, a few years ago, and have listened to her ever since. I am writing a research paper on the use of rap in Palestinian solidarity and anti-occupation movements, and found a few articles that I think may be interesting when thinking about non-violent movements.
This article is called "Can't Stop the SlingShot", a reference to the commonly-known symbol of Palestinian resistance. It was written on the documentary SlingShot Hip Hop, which followed the rap movement in Palestine.
http://www.tikkun.org/nextgen/cant-stop-the-slinshot-hip-hop-arises-in-palestine

Social Movements and Democratization

Social movements work within the MENA region because they mobilize the mass population to participate. Because of authoritarian rule or rentier economic systems, political participation is generally low throughout the MENA region. Dissent is not heard, and if it is voiced, it is quickly silenced by national security forces. Social movements have had success in combating this suppression. For example, within Syria the revolution was able to gain legitimacy and media attention voicing popular concerns with the administration. And in Tunisia, the Gafsa protests led to popular chants and mobilization. In both cases, the movements were strengthened when the government attempted to use force and brutality to stop them. People were angered and the violence and began to support the movements.

In respect to opportunities, the first necessary requirement for a social movement is support. In authoritarian regimes and rentier states, the majority of the population is either repressed or uninvolved with governance. This leads to dissent because people's concerns are not being heard or met by the government in power. This leads to a ripe opportunity for a movement to take hold. Also, timing and political action by the state internationally can be an opportunity. For example, when Bashar al-Assad withdrew troops from Lebanon. Or when Israel invaded Palestine and the Golan region. These actions can lead to the spread of dissent through the home country, giving the opportunity for protests and other forms of social movements.

One primary challenge of a social movement  calling for democratic participation is the state in power. Authorization regimes have shown that they are willing to use violent force to suppress movements. They jail and kill protesters. This can escalate a social movement into a civil war, like what happened in Syria.

For revolutionary movements, opportunity of gaining a wide following quickly is more prevalent. However, they are also more likely to be met with military force. They can escalate so quickly that violence can replace and form of non-violent ideology like boycotts and protests. For non-revolutionary movements, gaining support can be a real challenge. Because they move slower, a sense of urgency can be lacking. However, in a slower, systematic approach, there is less of a chance of a complete toppling of a government which leads to a more stable transition. Also, violence by the state is less of a risk.

Social Movements and Democratization

You have thus far in this class learned about the potential of social movements as an avenue of democratic representation and about the state in the MENA region. I want you to try to make a link between these two issues - how might social movements work/not work in the different types of states you find across the region? In other words, what opportunities and/or challenges do you see to social movements  functioning as an avenue of democratic participation in the region? And how do you think these opportunities/challenges differ between revolutionary and non-revolutionary movements?

Interesting Article

Hi all,

I was assigned an interesting reading for another class that I thought was very applicable to our class. It follows the Orientalist rhetoric of President Bush in his post 9/11 remarks. It is called "The Construction of Arabs as Enemies" by Debra Merskin.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327825mcs0702_2

The Legitimacy of Rentier States

      Many states in MENA suffer from an apparent paradox in that they are seen as illegitimate in the eyes of their people yet, at the same time, they tend to be large, interventionist states. Both aspects of this paradox can be explained by the status of many MENA states as rentier states. Rentier economies create a state that is disjointed from its populace. While this independence can make the state stronger in resisting the will of its people, it disincentivizes the state from trying to maintain its legitimacy.

      In rentier states, the vast majority of the state's budget is funded by external rent such as oil export revenue or foreign military aid as are common in MENA. Because of the abundance of revenue that comes from external rent, these states collect very little, if any, taxes from their citizens; the gathering of revenue in these states is a process that is uninvolved with the states' citizens. This independence means that the state does not rely on its people for funding and can spend its money independent of the will of its people. Since there is no taxation, there is no representation of the people in rentier states. 

      For this reason, the social contract between the people and the state is broken. The people are reliant on the state for security, social services, and infrastructure, but the state is reliant on the people for nothing. The social contract in rentier states is not negotiated between the people and the state, but rather the state negotiates within itself, between elites. Occasionally, counter-elites such as local leaders have a small say in this, but they can be easily paid off to support the state with money collected from rent. This skewed social contract makes a state that solely serves the interests of the government elites as the government has no incentive to support the people outside of the bare minimum necessary to prevent a mass uprising. The government has little incentive to serve the interests of the people; the rentier states only driving motivation is self-preservation which includes the appeasement of the government elites essential to maintaining the state and sustaining the channels necessary for the collection of external rent. 

      Because these states do not act with respect for the interests of their people, they are seen as illegitimate. However, this does not affect the ability of the rentier state to rule as it is entirely independent of the people. States financed primarily by the laying of taxes on its citizens do not have this luxury. Most states are dependent on their legitimacy in their right to rule, but rentier states are indifferent to legitimacy. Not only do rentier states tend to be less legitimate, they are entirely unconcerned with their legitimacy since it is not something that they are reliant on to maintain their power.