Civil society is something that has been difficult to define with one definition, as civil society can mean different things for different people. Spurk defines civil society as consisting of "... a huge variety of mainly voluntary organizations and associations that maintain different objectives, interests, and ideologies," (6). According to Spurk, while civil society does often interact with the social/private, economic, and political spheres very closely, it is its own separate entity that is independent of these spheres (6-7). Civil society is not political even though it is involved in the politics of a state, it is not economic even though it is involved in the economy, and it is not a part of the private realm even though it does affect that sector as well. In some cases, actors that are in these other sectors do act as members of civil society which results in the "blurring" of the lines between civil society and the other sectors in some cases.
There are seven functions of civil society based on Spurk's extended functional approach to analyzing civil society (23-24). The most basic role of civil society is to protect the freedom of the citizenry from authorities. Civil society also holds the state accountable for its actions (or inactions) to ensure that the state is upholding human rights and fulfilling its end of the social contract to its people. It helps facilitate communication so that the citizens are able to express their interests to raise awareness and facilitate debate. The socialization of the people is another task of civil society in order to promote a democratic attitude in the people. Civil society helps build communities that can bridge societal gaps and unite the people. Civil society also acts as an intermediary between the people and the state to facilitate communication between the two. Finally, civil society delivers services to the citizens especially in cases where the state is weak. Through the execution of these roles, an effective civil society can greatly increase the space for political participation by the citizens.
However, the civil society MENA have had trouble in performing these functions because of the repressive, autocratic regimes of MENA. The outcome of this suppression depends on how it is carried out and how the suppression is perceived by the people. Because of these variations, suppression can result in one of two outcomes according to Vairel: the radicalization of the civil society or the greater mobilization of civil society (41).
When civil society is made more radical because of repression, it becomes less effected at affecting change in the society. Radical groups are more divisive than uniting, which means that they do not have as large of a backing if they had been able to unite more people behind them. Radical groups face fewer political opportunities and more political restraints, they are less able to mobilize resources because of their smaller base and the fact that they are less likely to receive international assistance if they are seen as radical, and the way that they frame their narrative can push citizens to oppose their objectives. This outcome is produced whenever the state is especially violent in its repression and is selective in whom it targets.
Counterintuitively, repression by the state can actually strengthen the civil society in some cases. When the state represses indiscriminately, it can attract more people to the civil society and increase their ability to enact change. The people unite behind the civil society against the government. Also, if people perceive a threat from the government, they are quickly mobilized and since the actual force is not present yet to repress the people, they are not discouraged from joining the civil society.
I would say that civil society in MENA is generally weak in fulfilling its roles. The repressive regimes have become especially brutal in their measures and have targeted specific groups rather than the whole populations. An example of this is the case of Egypt. Sisi's regime is targeting the Muslim Brotherhood opposition group, which is seen as a radical Islamic group, rather than targeting the population. The actions of the regime have resulted in little effective action from the civil society because of Sisi's targeted approach and the Muslim Brotherhood's inability to unite the Egyptian people. One could also point to the failures of initiatives to promote democracy in the region as an indication of the weakness of civil society in MENA. After the "Arab Spring" revolutions of 2011, few of the democratic regimes remained in power and MENA states are just as if not more repressive and authoritarian than before the revolutions. Civil society in MENA has been unable to fulfill its seven roles and states' powers have gone unchecked in the MENA region as a result of their ineffectiveness.
However, the civil society MENA have had trouble in performing these functions because of the repressive, autocratic regimes of MENA. The outcome of this suppression depends on how it is carried out and how the suppression is perceived by the people. Because of these variations, suppression can result in one of two outcomes according to Vairel: the radicalization of the civil society or the greater mobilization of civil society (41).
When civil society is made more radical because of repression, it becomes less effected at affecting change in the society. Radical groups are more divisive than uniting, which means that they do not have as large of a backing if they had been able to unite more people behind them. Radical groups face fewer political opportunities and more political restraints, they are less able to mobilize resources because of their smaller base and the fact that they are less likely to receive international assistance if they are seen as radical, and the way that they frame their narrative can push citizens to oppose their objectives. This outcome is produced whenever the state is especially violent in its repression and is selective in whom it targets.
Counterintuitively, repression by the state can actually strengthen the civil society in some cases. When the state represses indiscriminately, it can attract more people to the civil society and increase their ability to enact change. The people unite behind the civil society against the government. Also, if people perceive a threat from the government, they are quickly mobilized and since the actual force is not present yet to repress the people, they are not discouraged from joining the civil society.
I would say that civil society in MENA is generally weak in fulfilling its roles. The repressive regimes have become especially brutal in their measures and have targeted specific groups rather than the whole populations. An example of this is the case of Egypt. Sisi's regime is targeting the Muslim Brotherhood opposition group, which is seen as a radical Islamic group, rather than targeting the population. The actions of the regime have resulted in little effective action from the civil society because of Sisi's targeted approach and the Muslim Brotherhood's inability to unite the Egyptian people. One could also point to the failures of initiatives to promote democracy in the region as an indication of the weakness of civil society in MENA. After the "Arab Spring" revolutions of 2011, few of the democratic regimes remained in power and MENA states are just as if not more repressive and authoritarian than before the revolutions. Civil society in MENA has been unable to fulfill its seven roles and states' powers have gone unchecked in the MENA region as a result of their ineffectiveness.
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