Lack of Democratization in MENA

Bellin writes in her piece, "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders" that, most states in the MENA region have not democratized or even begun transitioning towards democracy yet, because of present conditions within the states.  She argues that it is not because of the prerequisite, non-democratic elements in these countries, but rather the fact that they have strong government heads who are against democracy and robust coercive apparatuses.  Bellin is right to an extent.  However, I believe the MENA region has not been able to make progress in this area for both prerequisite and present issues within the countries.  

The anti-democratic prerequisites mentioned in Bellin’s piece were a weak civil society, an economy that is largely in the state's hands, people who are poor, illiterate and inequality that is significant, countries geographically isolated from democratic examples, and the existence of cultures that are inhospitable to democracy.  While she mentions that these should still be considered in determining what keeps MENA states from democratizing, I think a couple should be considered major constraints. 

The present conditions would not be reasons the MENA states have not democratized without some of the prerequisites.  For example, presently the people who hold political power within these states have an immense amount of power over the people and therefore are able to maintain a monopoly on means of coercion and rebellion.  This would not be true without the fact that the people they govern, are highly illiterate and poor.  It is much easier for the government to persuade and manipulate these populations because they do not have the educations or resources to effectively revolt against their oppressors. 

In light of the Arab Revolts of 2011, I think Bellin’s argument is slightly inaccurate.  She argues that state power and the robustness of coercive apparatuses within the governments make revolution and change nearly impossible when in 2011 the people actually came fairly close to all out rebellion.  These people were able to speak out however, they could not fulfill their goals maybe because they did not plan enough.  Leaders were forced to step down in several countries however, these most of these states are still not free from oppression today.  Bellin writes about how coup d’etats are not always effective because once the position is left open it is up for grabs by anyone and everyone who wants it which can sometimes result in an even more oppressive regime.  In this way Bellin’s argument is relevant to the Arab Spring however, when she says that states will squash any initiatives favorable to democracy, she is wrong.  The states were not strong enough to squash these revolts as they did go on for months and some even achieved their goals of overthrowing oppressive leaders.  The revolutionaries were simply unsuccessful in maintaining the power and influence they had earned afterwards.

Bellin would probably describe the events in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 as being due to state inefficiencies, not the power of civil society.  When Tunisian and Egyptian rebels united technologically via social media and strategized about how to take down their oppressive leaders, the state governments did not do anything to stop them.  Bellin would argue that in Egypt especially, Mubarak lacked the strength and the robust coercive apparatus necessary to squash the democratic initiatives.     

In conclusion, I do not think it is accurate to say that the civil society in the MENA region is “weak and…an ineffective champion of democracy.”  There have been some successful campaigns for democracy in this region so therefore they are not weak in regards to this.  These states have also gained from time to time democratic elements in some areas such as Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia.  They are not ineffective champions of democracy indefinitely although they have struggled with it the most in the world I would say.