MENA and Civil Society
The status of civil society in the MENA region is a very complicated thing because as noted in "Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa", Arab political regimes are marked strongly by repression. Many put forth that MENA civil society is weak because of this, along with the fact that it has been extremely difficult for any type of successful democracy to penetrate the region. However, as the book also states, even limited openings and action within civil society can create visible change. A very interesting argument is made by Charles Tilly, as he asserts that people mobilize more easily and quickly when a threat is perceived than when an opportunity is perceived. This may be supported by simple psychology in that when a threat is noticed, it is human nature to come to the defense of yourself and your rights. All over the world we see [perceived] threats being carried out by governments and people rising to make their voice heard in opposition to this danger. The book uses the example of Egyptian civil society demonstrating this back in 2005 when two judges were punished for denouncing fraudulent actions by the government. There are many examples like this one where citizens in MENA countries gather to stand up for specific causes that can have very dangerous consequences. Do their efforts always work? No, but the strength and rate at which MENA civil society is growing should not be underestimated.
It is also interesting to note clear distinctions between MENA civil society and others around the world. The MENA region has an interesting challenge in that there are more "modern" civil society groups that are more human rights-focused and more "traditional" human rights groups that are more Islamic in nature. I thought it was interesting that a challenge is that the human rights civil society groups tend to be more elitist, while the Islamic groups have the potential to appeal to the masses. When discussing MENA civil society, we also must included the inclusion of foreign influence and factors that play a role in radicalization vs. deterrence. In the book we are asked this: how does U.S. influence (and Western influence in general) affect the governments of Egypt and Morocco and therefore the civil societies of Egypt and Morocco? What factors/actions of the government determine whether or not people are deterred from civil society action or more radical about civil society action? Does the answer to the latter question revert back to Tilley's argument that perceived threats drive people to more radical action?
As discussed in the readings, modern times have shown that civil society has become more than just the citizenry casting a vote. It has come to be made up of individuals and organizations that are determined to give a voice to historically marginalized groups so that they may have a larger role in the [political] process of that society. In the case of MENA, the marginalized groups have been the people in regards to their say in the government's actions and how they are treated as citizens. Robert Putnam says that civil society and the actions associated with it affect the health of democracy. If MENA civil society continues to grow in a progressive way, maybe that is a key tool to their democratization.
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